

THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY


By the same Author

ENGLISH POLITICAL THEORY

THE MEANING OF
DEMOCRACY
COMPUTERISED

By

IVOR BROWN



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*Social
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“ Words are wise men’s counters, they do but
reckon by them; but they are the money of
fools.”

Thomas Hobbes.

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FOREWORD TO THE FOURTH EDITION

'A WORD to conjure with' is a cliché familiar to all readers. But there are always times when the spell-binders and magicians of public life do seize particular words and conjure with them. As I write psychology is providing most of the conjurers' outfit. Complex and repression, paranoia and schizophrenia are dragged into every discussion as though they settled the issue. But we neither explain bad conduct nor cure it by wrapping it up in long words. When the first edition of this book appeared Democracy was 'a word to conjure with'. That, indeed, was why I wrote the book. It seemed to me then, and it seems to me still, a necessary task to analyse this noble-sounding salve and to find out just what it means and what it implies in terms of human rights and human duties.

In the year 1920 the halo which hung about the word had not been dispersed. A great victory had been won 'for democracy': democracy was being implanted by the Peace Treaties with a fairly complete confidence that man, being a rational animal, would, if he were liberated from old tyrannies and given certain powers of self-determination, genuinely and sensibly use that freedom in order to set up and maintain a liberal existence. By this was meant a life in which majority verdicts were peaceably made and firmly honoured; at the same time it was understood that those verdicts would themselves be liberal and not oppressive to minorities.

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This was the Wilsonian Ideal, an ideal which enabled the ill-fated President, himself no natural spell-binder, to speak through the roar of guns and across the oceans to an attentive and enthusiastic world. The thing seemed so simple. Surely mankind would arise and seize its blessings. But the next three decades were to see the ideal dwindle away: another and even more gigantic war had to be fought and won in order to keep democracy from total destruction: and, at the end of that war, with yet another hard-won victory for liberty, there was far less self-government among the European nations than there had been before.

Even in those countries where the democratic principle, temporarily overthrown, had been restored by the victors, it would have been absurdly optimistic to suppose that democracy was safe. In 1948 it was by no means certain that self-government and liberal ideas of human rights and obligations would survive in France and Italy. The Communist pressure was strong: the reactionary alternative to Communism was also menacing. Fortunately various influences, the statesmanship of the U.S.A. in coming to the economic rescue of the tottering democracies, the detestation of Marxian materialism nourished by the Churches, the loyalty to reason and tolerance sustained by what was left of the old liberalism, and a growing comprehension that Communism did not in fact provide the earthly paradise which it promised, all worked together to give the ideal of a free community yet another chance.

The mistake made in all good faith and with a certain splendid, but hasty, confidence by the democrats had been to over-rate the human instinct for

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freedom and to under-rate the effect of the mass formation. Even while Wilson's idealism was yet unbroken, such thinkers as the Brothers Capek in Czecho-Slovakia were contemplating, in their stories and plays, the mechanization of man himself as a Robot and the similarity between the Insect World, with its blind, instinctive discipline, and the human society supposedly composed of people enjoying the right to think, speak, and choose for themselves. They were all too soon to be justified by the rise of Fascism and Nazism on the one side and of Communism on the other.

The democrats had reckoned without hunger of the body and inertia of the mind. The colossal economic distresses of the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties forced the millions of unemployed and despairing people to discard the machinery of government which had failed to give them work and food and to seek a rescue by Leaders. The latter, realising that the democracies had failed to satisfy not only the stomachs but the emotions of their peoples, proceeded to build new hopes of national glory based on the idea of mass-strength. They realised that the desire for liberty was not deep-rooted and that vast numbers of people could be happy enough as cogs in a machine provided that the machine ground out a sufficient supply of creature comforts. They further envisaged the satisfaction that many derive from being released from the necessity of thinking and choosing for themselves. The allure of flags, slogans, mass-movements, and of self-surrender to magnetic leadership and the hysteria which it created, was fully understood by Hitler, Mussolini, and their kind.

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The millions who paraded for National Socialism often did so with considerable and genuine gusto. The tedium of stopping to think and the worry of self-determination had been taken from them. Even goose-stepping is not unpleasant—to geese. The democrats, with their faith in Homo Sapiens, free to choose his own good and able to follow up this choice with sensible action, had tragically under-estimated the laziness and timidity of the millions who now seemed to derive a positive pleasure from self-immolation to the harsh regimen of the new, thought-saving, work-providing autocracy. The Homo Sapiens accepted his new status of Insect almost with alacrity. It was a heart-breaking period for those who had accepted the age-long ideals of freedom through self-government. They had not only to revise their psychology: they had to realise that people must be adequately fed and housed before they can settle down to think. It is not true that 'economics always precede politics' or that a nation's morals are simply an expression of its money values. But it is true that democracy cannot be abstracted from a general well-being. It has got to work first of all in terms of the larder if it is also to mould and execute the law. The new tyrannies provided bread and some of the tyrants were a circus in themselves.

The most of this is as true to-day as it was in the nineteen-thirties. We cannot assume that the right to vote is so highly esteemed that men will not abandon it for a foolish phrase which includes the promise of material benefit. Certainly, the dangers of complacency are less than they were; when I was young we were all engaged on reading or constructing

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Utopias. Our eyes were turned forward to descry the possible bliss that Homo Sapiens could achieve. Nobody writes Utopias to-day: instead our most admired sociologists, men like Aldous Huxley and George Orwell, paint the future in such lurid tints and create such visions of hell on earth as to make early or even immediate death seem almost the supreme felicity. We are afraid not only of bodily destructions by appalling weapons: we are afraid of new mental tyrannies which autocracy, using every tool of intellectual oppression and degradation, may implant upon the spirit of man.

I am not myself quite so pessimistic as these sad sages and prophets of a base new world. At the same time I realise that, if we are going to save freedom of mind and person, we have got to think harder than ever. On the one hand we must abandon the old careless notion that people can draw physical nourishment from political rights and dine off a doctrine. Hunger was, is, and will be the prime enemy of democracy. That, I suppose, is now far more widely understood, but there is always the danger that democratic philosophy will fail in realistic psychology.

Secondly, we must keep thinking about politics with clear, analytical minds. Autocracy naturally hates thought: it always substitutes slogans for arguments and the emotional for the intellectual appeal. Its first steps are to seize what are called the 'mass media', the Press, the films, the radio, and all the organs of information and discussion, as well as putting under its sway the whole educational machine. The developments of modern science are on its side: the

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radio, for example, is easily monopolised and, when thus controlled, immensely effective in promoting one idea (or fallacy) and one only. When men depended on word of mouth, freedom was safer than in these days of printing-press and microphone, so easily captured and monopolised.

For that reason I do not regard this book as out of date. Far from it. The social environment has greatly altered, but the necessity for defining terms and realising their implications is no less great. It is not only a Conservative criticism of the Welfare State, to which modern democracies are moving, that it tends to stress rights before obligations. The Welfare State does meet the argument that hunger and unhappiness breed desperate remedies, which ultimately remedy nothing: in making war on misery it is a good servant of liberty. But it also stresses the pleasure of having equal shares without sufficiently acknowledging the importance of equal duties.


It is there that social theory must be brought to bear on the social problem. One of the conspicuous features of British life since 1945 has been the great difficulty encountered by the Labour Government in making its own supporters pay attention to its plain warnings and its urgent behests. Time and again it has pointed out the difficulties and dangers around and ahead of us and asked for co-operation in combating these perils. Time and again it has had to remind the citizen of what he ought to do in return for what he ought to get and is, in fact, getting. The answer, as a rule, has not been encouraging. It is not bad will alone that is at work; it is bad thinking, or no thinking at all. So a book which attempts an intellect-

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ual analysis of democracy need not, in my opinion, appear with any apology as this century ends the first half of its challenging span.

HAMPSTEAD,

October, 1949.



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AT the present moment Democracy may still be called a popular idea in the sense that everybody talks about it; but, in as far as it is associated with Parliamentary Government, it is regrettably discredited. It is at once the hope of the workers, and their despair. The idea is worshipped and the fact deplored. There is a widespread feeling that everything is wrong and an equally widespread uncertainty as to why it has gone wrong. And we are faced as a result with a paradoxical situation in which the more blunders we, of the nominally democratic countries, make, the more do we call upon the name of democracy. Those who are most loud in their protests against conduct which certainly seems to have popular support are also most loud in their praises of democracy. We are all well acquainted with the individual who rises at every meeting on every subject to suggest that the proper remedy is "democracy".

One thing at least is obvious. The word has come to mean anything; or rather it means so much that it means nothing at all. Exactly the same trouble has arisen with other political terms. We all believe in liberty, but very few of us agree as to what liberty is. The word Socialist is applied to thousands of people who detest each other's politics and economics as heartily as they detest capitalism. In my experience of adult education, I have seen over and over again the intellectual devastation caused by the use

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of undefined abstract terms. I have heard people arguing for hours about a phrase which they have never troubled to dissect. Often they would have found an agreement in five minutes if they had stopped to discover their respective interpretations of the term. But the word was a symbol like a national flag; it was the word that roused their loyalty or their animosity; it was for the word they fought and not for the thing. Just as the State, existing because of the individual and for the individual, often swallows him up and destroys him, so the word, existing because of the idea and for the idea, buries its parent beneath a mass of irrelevance. It is from such filial violence that the idea of democracy is being condemned to suffocation.

This book has been written simply as an essay in definition, an attempt to show what democracy, stripped clean of its false clothing, does imply. It is not a constructive book, if by that phrase is meant an effort to solve constitutional and social problems. Each of these problems has a considerable literature of its own and must be dealt with on its own merits. But it is, I hope, constructive, in so far as no building is safe, however admirably designed, unless it has firm foundations. My ambition has been to discover, or at least to discuss, the essential elements of the democratic idea, and to give a precise content to its phraseology. My readers, if any, will very probably dispute my definitions, but it is a great deal better to fight about definitions than to fight, as we usually do, about nothing at all.

The function of education, especially of adult education, is to my mind predominantly the task of

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seeking those general principles without which information is barren. It is the putting together of our disjointed fragments of experience and knowledge so that we may understand life more clearly, use it better, and enjoy it more. [The world is full of people who, although they have accumulated a great many facts about this subject and about that, are fundamentally uneducated because all their learning is isolated ; lacking all sense of proportion and balance, ignorant of the very conception of law, they must inevitably take a distorted view of life.] Or, a far worse contingency, their knowledge is remote from life altogether. The naturalist who prefers the stuffed specimen to the living animal ; the ornithologist with his paper army of Latin names ; the classical specialist who reads the Greek drama to analyse the use of conjunctions and to supply humanity with six volumes upon syntax ; the theologian who devotes a lifetime to the doctrinal controversies of the early Church ; the historian who proves conclusively (to the chagrin of another of his kind) that the events of 345 B.C. really happened in 346 B.C. Such people, mere fractions of real men and women, can give year after year to the compilation of facts and yet keep those facts utterly outside their emotions. There are naturalists without wonder, scholars without awe, theologians without worship, economists without anger, historians who never laughed or hated or despaired. They may be wise, but who is jealous of their wisdom ? It is possible to know everything and understand nothing.

[The value of education stands or falls by its capacity to make life fuller and therefore more enjoyable.] If it is to help us to a clear outlook and a grasp of

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principle, it must do two things: it must renounce the pedantry of fruitless specialisation, and it must get below the surface of words to the unchanging level of realities. The world is surfeited with symbols. It needs no more beautiful abstractions and inspiring names, but only the experience for which those stand. In the political sphere we have had far too much praise of democracy as an ideal and too little thought about it as a thing. There are innumerable scraps and pieces of democratic machinery and a common lip-service to the idea of popular control; what is lacking is the co-ordination of knowledge and the desire to discover general principles. Many people apply themselves every year to the challenge of adult education; they come to it with a passionate enthusiasm and a genuine determination to sacrifice hard-earned leisure to the cause; they want to understand the world in which they live and work and suffer, and they are prepared to face real drudgery to gain that understanding. But, in the majority of cases, their previous education stopped at the age of fourteen or fifteen and, of necessity, their minds are untrained. They think in terms of words, not concepts. So, when they come face to face with the ordinary political thought of our day, they are at once baffled by the formidable phrases, vague and transitory meanings, and the common contempt of precision. We interchange words like Red and Reactionary, which ought to mean a great deal, and turn them into empty vehicles of abuse, a cruel snare for those who are still the servants of nomenclature.

The obvious task for education at the present is to concentrate more upon improving our thinking than

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upon increasing our information. Books abound, and the keen student, whatever his financial position, can usually get his books if he makes use of his chances. But a plethora of books may lead only to a plethora of confusion ; reading without judgment is like driving in the dark. Here is another book, but I would make this excuse in its favour. It is written with the sole purpose of encouraging individual thought and criticism. One man who makes his philosophy for himself is worth twenty who take it ready-made from the shelves. If this book sets but a handful of people defining their terms and arguing about first principles, it will have achieved its purpose.

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CHAPTER ONE

ABSTRACT IDEAS

THE evolution of the human mind is marked by the transition from facts to ideas, from concrete to abstract. A primitive savage could understand the actual difference to his sensations between being at large and being tied up in chains long before he could frame the abstract ideas of liberty and bondage. The history of civilisation is the history of the growing power of ideas, and therefore it is a welcome sign that abstract ideas have attained to-day a wider use and dominion than ever before. There have been episodes in the development of society when a small people such as the Athenians have broken out from the darkness of barbarism into the shining light of ideas and of ideals; but these have been limited episodes, touching only a fraction of the world's population. To-day, however, owing to innumerable causes, the vast majority of men and women of the Western world are more and more influenced by ideas. Man is a traditional animal, the bond-slave of "that Monster Custom". Yet, even against the rocks of his innate conservatism, new conceptions, continually washed by the tides of education and propaganda, are beginning to prevail. Such great concepts as Liberty and Justice and Democracy have lived for ages, but they have never lived in the minds of so many at one time. They have been the torches to fire

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rare and mighty conflagrations ; but they have never till now been the small steady fires that warm innumerable homes.

Now we have reached an age when all are granted at least a smattering of education, when all have the power and opportunity to read, and when literature of all kinds is comparatively cheap and ready to hand. Abstract nouns are on every lip. Take the first ten lines of any speech or newspaper leader and you will be brought up against as many abstractions. While material interests are still intensely strong, they are being compelled to take cover under ideals, for the very reason that men have come to be as concerned about thoughts as about things, and to be as easily moved to action by idealist inspirations as by realist ambitions. Hypocrisy does, after all, mark a certain stage in moral progress, and it is something that men have begun to be ashamed of force and to mask their baser designs in the fair language of ideals. But, unfortunately, the growing power of abstract ideas, in a world where people are little accustomed to them, makes smooth the way for those who would juggle with those ideas to mystify their audience.

Abstract ideas are the developed mental weapons of man, as high explosives are his developed material weapons. And such weapons may be dangerous to those who use them. So it comes about that the loose and careless handling of an idea may be as hazardous as the loose and careless handling of explosives. If it is madness to play with a substance of whose properties one is ignorant, it is equal madness to play with language and concepts whose exact meanings are undecided. This was realised by one of the world's

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greatest men at an age when, in one small community, ideas were bandied about with much careless freedom. Socrates, a wandering teacher living at the end of Athens' golden age, came to the conclusion that loose thinking was just as harmful as loose living; indeed far more so, for he held, rightly or wrongly, that loose thinking was the cause of loose living. Accordingly he set to work to eradicate this evil, and his method was to insist that those who used abstract ideas should always be ready and able to define them. Thus he led his listeners and pupils into many arguments on the real meaning of such abstractions as courage and justice. We, too, live in an age when abstract ideas are being freely bandied about, the common coinage of a developing popular mind. Yet the number of people who could clearly define the terms they are habitually using must be exceedingly small. Never was there a time more ripe for a new Socratic method. One is tempted to adopt Wordsworth's famous lines on Milton to Socrates or to his great disciple and chronicler,

Plato, thou shouldst be living at this hour,
England hath need of thee; she is a fen—

This point can easily be made plain by a single instance. During and after the First World War every article or book on current affairs and every speech by a politician on the state of Europe contained its allusion to the sacred principle of nationality. That slogan is still potent with the smaller social units. It sounds well; it sounds, on the face of it, quite simple. Yet we cannot pause there. We have got

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to ask and ask with relentless determination, "What do we mean by nationality?" Who dare wager that one in twenty of our phrase-mongers has a definition ready to hand? They would say after a little hesitation, "Common blood, common race, that sort of thing!" No one denies nationality to Switzerland. But the Swiss have neither common tongue nor common race. Nor have the people of the United States. The Jews have common race and belong to every nation. Well then, common territory? But that is just the disputed issue. Are all peoples who have common territory to-day to share it for ever? They do not want to, they repudiate their common nationality. After all, what decided the borders of these territories? Strategic frontiers and old artificial treaties often enough, the kind of arrangement that makes the arbitrary border between France and West Flanders. No principle is at work here; and if nationality is based on territorial considerations, it is based on a series of accidents. Obviously the matter is not so simple as it first seemed. In fact, after a Socratic process of whittling away definitions that will not work, it is found that nationality is simply a community of feeling based on certain historical and geographical factors and a consequent act of will. Nations exist because certain groups of people, bound together sometimes by race, sometimes by language, sometimes by religion, sometimes by accidents of frontier and historical tradition, often by combinations of these, do feel a sense of unity and so will to be a nation.

Another good example is afforded by the word "Progress". This is a relative term; that is to say,

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its meaning is governed by another term accompanying it. Progress means, by derivation, "going forward", and plainly it is possible to go forward in two or three directions. You can go forward to Heaven or to Hell. To call a man unprogressive, simply means, as a rule, that he won't go where you want him to. Towards the end of his novel *Joan and Peter*, Mr. Wells rebuked the Chesterton and Belloc school for not being "progressive". This is merely begging the very vital question, "What is Progress?" Abstractions undefined are like loose sign-posts swinging in the wind; the traveller can take them as pointing in any direction he chooses to go.

The purpose of this book is to take one of the commonest abstract ideas, one that is claimed as an essential of civilised society, and to attempt to discover, by constant definition, its genuine meaning and content. Most of us in these days make at least a superficial claim to be the true supporters of Democracy. The Communists, bitter enemies of ordinary democratic ideas and institutions, call their form of absolutism 'Workers' Democracy'. But it is obvious that everyone has not the same political and economic Utopia. Therefore if ten absolutely different people with ten absolutely different ideals can all say that they want democracy, and that their policies are democratic, it is plain that democracy must be a term so elastic as to be almost useless. It really does not help us much to talk of "making the world safe for democracy", when what A calls democracy, B calls plutocracy, and what C calls democracy, D calls anarchy, Communism, and the end of all things.

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During the first World War, vaguely called a war for democracy, power in Great Britain passed more than ever into the hands of the small governing class and its bureaucratic hangers-on. A witty man remarked during that period that Mr. Lloyd-George called Britain a free country because it was a place where he was free to do what he liked. Then a general election confirmed the clique in power and their supporters called the new Government "democratic" because it had won its election and their opponents called it "undemocratic" because of the peculiar methods of the Coalition Whips; they also could call the new Parliament undemocratic because the minority parties had fewer seats than a fair method of representation would have given them. One man proves to you that Proportional Representation is the only "democratic" way of conducting an election, while another shows it to be utterly undemocratic because it plays into the hands of the party machine. And all the while there is the egregious optimist who is going to solve every problem and every dispute by "democracy". In fact, the puzzled seeker after truth will probably come to the conclusion that "democratic" and "undemocratic" mean to most people who use the words nothing more than desirable and undesirable.

Yet what a sorry state of affairs! Here is a supreme idea for which men are willing to be imprisoned and tortured, to kill and to be killed; and no two people have the same view as to its meaning. Consider the waste of paper and breath and effort, of temper and money and life, involved by such a misunderstanding. Here is a noble word that once was like a sharp and

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gleaming knife to eradicate the cancers of society—the very name of it is beautiful, said a Greek apologist—and now it is so hacked and blunted by misuse that it is no longer of any value for the surgery of state-craft; like an outworn razor, it is thrown away, and he who uses it will only do himself damage. The process, however, is only natural. Lay the delicate weapon of the mind before the millions of all classes who have been taught to read but not to think, and they will very soon treat it as they would a hammer or a pick-axe. They may be masters of the copy-book, but they are slaves of the catchword. The great words of history and of philosophy become the “mumbo-jumbo” of demented rhetoric. Anything means everything. Democracy, which was to be a panacea, becomes a pantehnicon.

This state of affairs demands a remedy, and the remedy lies with the individuals who go to make up the community. It is for them to resolve that they will not use terms which they cannot define. As an encouragement, however trivial, to that resolve this book is written. It is based upon a profound conviction that the only way to make the world safe for democracy is to start by defining it.

Many and different ideas have been put forward at various times by various thinkers as means to the salvation of society. We have been told to put our faith in Christianity and in Humanism, in Authority, and in Democracy, in Non-Resistance and in Big Battalions, in Socialism and in Industrialism, in Great Men and Votes for Women. Men have believed and struggled and failed; have built towering hopes and seen them fall to the ground; have dreamed shining

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dreams and seen them fade in the grey light of reality. For this there are many reasons, man's own petty jealousies and mean ambitions not least. But there is one predominant reason. It is the very form and fashion of folly to make a goal of abstract ideas when that goal cannot be recognised in concrete terms of actual human experience. Vain to seek salvation in democracy when you have only the haziest notion as to what democracy is. Certainly force and material wealth will not save us; abstract ideas, so often despised by the practical man, alone can do that. But first we must establish full dominion over those ideas. We must go back to the old Socratic method and make ourselves efficient craftsmen of politics. To do this we must begin at the beginning, becoming the apprentices of precision and the journeymen of definition. Only thus can we become masters of our tool, which is the mind.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DERIVATION OF DEMOCRACY AND THE MEANING OF SOVEREIGNTY

THE obvious method of setting out on our task of definition is to investigate the derivation of our particular term. Democracy is a transliteration of the Greek word, *demokratia*, which was a combination of two other Greek words—*demos*, the people, and *kratia*, power. Democracy means then, by derivation, people's power. This was contrasted by the Greek theorists with a series of other powers. There was Monarchy from *monos*, alone, and *arche*, rule. Oligarchy came from *oligoi* few, and *arche*, rule, and Aristocracy from *aristoi*, best, and *kratia*, power, the best men's power. These distinctions seem simple enough at first sight, but they carry with them considerable complications. Aristocracy, for instance, the power of the best, is vague, because best is a relative term and implies the question, "best in what?" The meaning generally attached is, "best in birth", and the word aristocracy was so used in Great Britain at one time. But the Greeks who first employed the word certainly referred to a more general excellence and there is no reason why we should not attach to it the signification of best in character and brain. Underlying the support of government by blue blood, there is often the implica-

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tion that superiority in character and brain necessarily accompanies superiority in birth. It is hardly worth while, however, to discuss the origin and validity of such fantastic superstitions.

Democracy then, is people's power, and a democratic State is a community in which the masses are powerful. That seems to be a perfectly plain statement, but it is capable of a double construction. For there comes to mind an old assertion that government is based ultimately on opinion and not on force. On whose opinion? On the opinion of the governed, that is to say, of the people. But if all government is based on the opinion of the people, then surely all government is democratic and to distinguish democracies from any other 'ocracies is the merest triviality and hair-splitting. Let us first examine the validity of the statement that government is based on opinion, not on force. On the whole, it will be found true in the main, but there are exceptions to it and it needs qualification. It is best to take some historical examples of so-called tyrannies and to see whether it can fairly be said that they rested on public opinion. The late Czarism of Russia was desperately resented by a few, and it was irksome to many; but the majority of Russians were either too ignorant or too indifferent, owing to lack of education, difficulties of communication and the pressing problem of maintaining a livelihood in the hard agrarian struggle, to bother themselves with revolutionary action. Or else, while wishing to be rid of the Czarism and its bureaucratic administration, they felt that the trouble and danger of an upheaval were not worth risking for the end in view. So the tyranny continued to exist, not

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founded on a definite manifestation of popularity, but on an indefinite state of acquiescence. There came a breaking-point. The complete mismanagement of the war and the sacrifice of millions of peasants' lives owing to the incompetence of the militarist party proved too much for the long patience of the moujik and the hitherto loyal artisan. They passed from a dull acquiescence in Czarism to a fervid hostility. They were won over in masses by the revolutionary few, and took definite and decisive action against the old régime. The revolution used force, but the revolutionary idea was prior to the revolutionary force. It was not the violence that made the opinion, but the opinion that made the violence. Hence it may reasonably be argued that both Czarism and the Revolution were based on popular opinion and, if we are to define democracy as government by popular opinion, then both were in that sense democratic. The same held true of Kaiserism in Germany and Austria. The 1918 revolutions were the external signs of a change from tolerance of an autocratic system to a pronounced and active intolerance. Similarly, all the age-long tyrannies of history may be shown to have their roots in public willingness to put up with the minor inconveniences of monarchy and oligarchy as being preferable to the major dangers and privations of an attempted revolution.

On the other hand, it is at least conceivable that a small minority of rulers with an efficiently trained and armed soldiery could hold in subjection a far larger number of unarmed or poorly armed people, all of whom eagerly demanded freedom and were willing to take any risk to win it, short of facing

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the inevitable annihilation that a rebellion would cause. In this case it may fairly be claimed that the opinion of the governed had nothing to do with their government, although one who wished to strain a point might perhaps contend that the subjects' preference of life under that rule to facing death or the severest penalties in revolt, was a proof that opinion had something to do with their condition. To that length, however, we can hardly follow the argument. The new Police States and totalitarian régimes live either in defiance of opinion by their power to terrorise or amid a cowering apathy. Moreover there is usually a minority party that connives at or openly supports the autocrats. The tyrannies of to-day are based on ruthless use of strength plus the will to dominate of a strong minority.

Fascists and Communists equally claim to be representing the popular will and opinion, preventing, by their autocratic methods, the chicanery of democratic politicians.

Thus, if democracy means nothing more than government according to the opinion of the governed, all government may be called democratic, and the word democracy has come to mean so much that it really means nothing at all. This is an unsatisfactory conclusion, and we must look around to see whether there has been any error in the reasoning that led to it. Indeed, the confusion is not far to seek; it lies in the acceptance of acquiescence and will as identical things. For the tolerant opinion which allows another to govern you is one thing; the resolute determination to be self-governing is another. Nearly all governments are based on opinion; very

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few on an active passion for self-determination. The two extremes are complete toleration of the arbitrary and irresponsible tyranny of a ruling class and a thorough resolve on the part of all the individual citizens that the machinery of government shall be controlled strictly in accordance with the common will. Most modern democracies lie somewhere between these poles. The confusion in which we became involved is really the old confusion about the nature of Sovereignty.

Throughout the history of thought, political theorists have been concerned to discover the ultimate source of power in any community. They wanted to find the real fount of authority whence the temporary rulers drew their sway. This ultimate source of power is technically known as Sovereignty. Here, as usual, the confusion and the wrangling are about an abstract idea, and yet the philosophers went in search of it before they sufficiently defined it and agreed among themselves as to what they were seeking for. Plainly there is nothing to be gained by looking for something which you cannot recognise.

Sovereign power, on reflection, must mean at least two things, if not more. In every community there is one particular person or body of persons who make and unmake law. It is perfectly easy to discover who are these persons or bodies in the various countries of the world. The legal sovereign, to be technical, is determinate. In Great Britain whatever is ordained by the King and the two Houses of Parliament is law and must be obeyed on pain of punishment. Theoretically this sovereign body controls the executive and the judiciary powers, that is to say, the people who

administer the laws. It does not, of course, make morality, because the law may be immoral ; but once elected, the House of Commons, if supported by the King and the House of Lords, can do no legal wrong ; it can, of course, do evil in the eyes of morality but not wrong in the eyes of the law. It can uproot the whole British Constitution, and erect a new one in its place ; it can enfranchise and disfranchise. Whatever Parliament chooses to do, the electors have no legal rights against it, and no legal duty but to obey. They have only the right to refuse to re-elect members or governments who have disobeyed their electoral mandate, and apparently Parliament has the right to continue its life indefinitely. If a Parliament were to do this in the face of a popular demand for a new election, it might become moral for the electors to act illegally and revolt against Parliament, but nothing could make such conduct legal. Parliament, however immoral, would have the law on its side, for Parliament has the legal sovereignty. In countries like the United States, where there is a written Constitution apart from the law-making of Congress, the situation is more complex, but it is not necessary to go into these details and complications at present ; it is enough to demonstrate the point that in every state there is a person or a body of persons who hold the sources of legal power and that this person or body can be found and definitely noted. This determinate person or body we shall refer to in future as the Actual Legal Sovereign.

But a moment's reflection will show that the Actual Legal Sovereign is not the real source of all power. Parliament, whatever its legal rights, does not act

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in a totally irresponsible way; it does acknowledge some master. The real source of power is, as we saw, the opinion of the governed. Behind the Actual Legal Sovereign in any community lies an Ultimate General Sovereign. This supreme force is nothing more or less than public opinion. This public opinion may be tolerant of different forms of Actual Legal Sovereignty. It may tolerate an individual tyrant or an oligarchy of birth or a plutocracy in the shape of wealthy newcomers or a mixture of these elements. Or it may decide that the public can best manage things for itself. It may, in fact, decide to merge as far as possible the two sovereignties. Thus the Actual Legal Sovereign will become dependent upon the Ultimate General Sovereign in detail as well as in theory. It may really be said to be identified with it.

This is the criterion of democracy. If democracy means government according to the opinion of the governed, then nearly all government is democratic and the word in question becomes meaningless. But the word acquires a very real and important meaning when the governed pass from acquiescence to volition, and determine to do for themselves what they have hitherto allowed others to do for them. Democracy begins as a spiritual assertion and an act of will. In undemocratic countries the many allow the few to run the machinery of government as they please, unless they violate too grossly all popular convictions and traditions. In democratic countries popular opinion is no longer vaguely tolerant, but definitely articulate. Not only do the many know what they want, but they see to getting it for themselves by capturing and controlling the instruments of government.

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Obviously, there are many intermediate stages in the path to democracy, but the perfect democracy could only be reached when the aspirations of the Ultimate General Sovereign were clearly formulated and accurately executed by the Actual Legal Sovereign. It cannot be too often emphasised in a world of incipient democracy that there is a vast gulf between government according to public opinion and government by the people. It is similar to the gulf fixed between the rich man who from sheer inertia pays servants to arrange his life for him and the rich man who pays servants to carry out his purposes. Both in the long run are powerful, but only one is self-governing. It is this difference which gives content and meaning to that much-abused word democracy.

CHAPTER THREE

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE PEOPLE

WE have seen that the essence of democracy is the combination in one body of the Ultimate General Sovereignty and the Actual Legal Sovereignty, that is to say the transition from a public opinion that tolerates monarchy or oligarchy to a public will for common self-government. But since we have throughout laid especial emphasis on the necessity for defining all our terms we must therefore ask and endeavour to answer the question, "What constitutes public opinion?" After all, opinions do not grow spontaneously in the body politic.

In the first place, it cannot be repeated too often that man is a traditional animal. The ordinary person acts far more upon hearsay, custom, and the deeply ingrained habits of his kind than upon the dictates of reason. The innate conservatism of people is most marked and most easily observed in their petty work-a-day affairs. Methods of cooking and of household management, for instance, are handed from generation to generation, and cannot easily be altered by the advice, however frequent and logical, of the domestic reformer. Superstitions die harder than tyrannies; kings, priests, and capitalists may come and go, but the bedroom window remains tightly closed, and best clothes are worn on Sundays. Huge and inevitable

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disappointment awaits the teacher who imagines the man, being reasonable, has only to be told the truth to follow it, and there have been many such; the history of thought is strewn with their wrecked hopes. A very good instance of the power of tradition was shown in Great Britain during the First World War. Though up to 1916 this was not a conscript country, it could, unfortunately, be said that war was, or formed part of, a national tradition. The idea of serving in the navy or army for a remuneration not based on ordinary commercial rates was familiar. But owing to the capitalist system of private enterprise there was no tradition of national service in industry. Accordingly it seemed right and proper to the national conscience that one man should face wounds, privation, and death for a shilling a day, while the shipowner and munition maker should make every penny or pound he could by exploiting the national necessity. Custom had taught these people that shortages meant high prices and big profits, and if the shortages were caused by a war in which their brothers were dying for a shilling a day, that was no concern of theirs. Commercial tradition said "exploit", and they exploited. It was just as much cricket to them as for a bowler to make use of a wet wicket.

It did not at that time occur to the custom-bound community that the carrying and selling of food was just as much a national service as fighting. Therefore the amazing paradox of stinting the men in the trenches and giving free play to the commercialism of the war worker, whether employer or employed, was continually enacted for the simple reason that

national tradition regarded industry as a game of grab. The price of labour was regulated by scarcity-value, and labourers could hardly be expected not to take advantage of such a scarcity. Capital took whatever profits it could skim off and could hardly be expected to cease creaming such plentiful milk. Again, men who would go far to avoid robbing a neighbour do not hesitate to cheat the State, which is their neighbour, in the matter of taxation, because tradition does not speak out strongly on this subject. Man lives by custom and the roots of public opinion are deeply set in a thick soil of illogical beliefs and practices, whose origin it would need an encyclopædia to determine.

But customs, though hardy and long-lived, do alter with the lapse of time. The strong, cold wind of reason prevails at last and they wither where they stood. It used to be a customary and a blameless practice to butcher anyone who did not conform to your own religious beliefs. Centuries elapsed before this ugly weed of custom was rooted up, but reason did win at last. Some day perhaps, reason will destroy the equally ugly habit of butchering people who happen to belong to a different nationality. This weed of war has tremendous tenacity, and to lay it low will be reason's greatest triumph. The cleansing power of reason is brought to bear on the mass of tradition by scattered individuals who always suffer heavily for their temerity. The custom-bound majority resist innovation for a long time and then, collapsing suddenly, take the new state of affairs for granted.

The first pioneers of Woman Suffrage were regarded much as cannibals or criminal lunatics, but after years of persecution and contempt their views became

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respectable and their measure passed suddenly into law with scarcely any comment or opposition. Probably the majority of the old scoffers hardly knew that it had happened. The truth seems to be that, if any determined minority bring forward a proposition that is not inherently ridiculous or utterly against the grain of human nature, and are prepared to go persistently on in the face of contumely and rebuff, they can, as it were, weave the new strand of thought into the texture of national tradition. Thus does private opinion work itself by slow degrees into the stuff of public opinion.

Before the days of cheap printing and almost universal reading news and opinions were grafted on to public information and tradition by wandering teachers and the drift of hearsay. A new idea or fact came to some man's ears and he repeated it to his friends, so that the matter was passed on and discussed over the cups or glasses in home or tavern. But with the introduction of a more general education and a wide demand for cheap literature new factors were set at work. It became obvious that the men who moulded the scheme of common education would be able to mould public opinion, and still more would the purveyors of newspapers be able to thrust their opinions on those who could not or would not think for themselves. Public opinion is tending therefore to become less traditional, though tradition is still immensely strong, and to become more artificial. The old situation, where a few reformers fought the big battalions of conservatism by word of mouth and by their own example, is now yielding to one where a few rich men or a few Trades Unions can present to

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millions of readers at the same moment their own form of news with their own significant silences and their own interested interpretation of that news.

Public opinion can thus be altered and manufactured more easily by the printed word. There still seem to be many men and women in this country who believe that if a thing is in print it must necessarily be true. Any psychologist who has studied the art of advertisement and realised its tremendous hypnotic power must admit the drastic effect of continual repetition. If the papers make the same statement day after day those who doubted it strongly at first will eventually begin to believe in it despite their own reasoning powers. This is not the place to discuss the evils inherent in this situation. The present question is solely one of fact. We are concerned with the raw material of public opinion ; it is not our business to criticise it.

Public opinion then is largely inherited in the shape of national tradition ; but in an ever-growing measure , it is subject to environment in the shape of external forces such as education and agitation. It is not one belief, but a vague mass of fears, desires, beliefs, and moral judgments ; in times of emotional stress this loose mass solidifies and there is a general intensification. Fears become panics, desires become passions, vague beliefs become strict creeds, and moral judgments become harsh and narrow condemnations. Public action takes place when public opinion on the subject in question takes form and becomes articulate. Democracy emerges when public opinion, derived from whatever source and stiffened by whatever forces, ceases to be tolerant of external rule and demands *

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expression in self-government. The seeds sown by prophets long since dead come to bearing at last, and public opinion becomes public determination. There is a demand for a change of Legal Sovereignty and for the introduction of government by the people as well as of the people.

"Government of the people, by the people, for the people." That is a popular catchword of democracy. But, according to our principle, we cannot leave any such phrase unexamined. We must demand a definition. It may seem to be a stupid question to ask "Who are the people?"; but it is not as stupid as it seems when we realise that complete adult suffrage is still to be sought in a "world made safe for democracy". To talk of government by the people may mean all or nothing until we have said what we mean by "the people". Here again definition is the very essence of the matter.

Democracy, as we saw, meant "people's power" in the Greek. Are we then to believe that the Greek democrats divided power equally among all the people? The way to divide power is to give individual rights, legal and political. Political rights would consist mainly of attendance at a Council or Parliament or the privilege of electing representatives to attend on one's behalf. This gives each person a share in the making of the laws which govern his life and so brings about the distribution of legal sovereignty among the citizens. The crucial point thus becomes the possession of citizenship and civic rights. But the Athenians themselves, the founders of democratic theory and for ever boasting of their own great essay in democratic practice, had only, at the outbreak of

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the Peloponnesian war, 30,000 enfranchised citizens in a population of 230,000. Citizenship was a charmed circle, from which aliens, slaves, and all women were excluded. Therefore, to say that in "democratic" Athens there was government by the people is a complete mis-statement, unless we give a very limited interpretation to the word "people". There was only government by a fragment of the whole people, and this was called democracy because a franchise so comparatively wide seemed remarkable in a world of oligarchies and tyrannies. When we come to British history and modern times we find that after the great Reform Bill of 1832, which the reactionaries regarded as the end of all things and the reformers as the key to a new Jerusalem, only a small percentage of the adult population was enfranchised. Even at the General Election of 1918, after the biggest Reform Bill of all, the people and the electorate were very different entities. The creators of the French Revolution, one of the greatest outbursts of democratic effort in all time, did not bother to enfranchise the female half of the nation. They were swift to maintain that the voice of the people was the voice of God, but they took upon themselves to limit participation in that divine utterance. Perhaps the reason why they laid so much emphasis on fraternity was because they were determined to have no sisters in the movement.

Democratic theory, like all innovations, has to fight its way against a vast barrier of conservative tradition. But the anti-democrats cannot rely on custom alone, strong though that fortress is. They, too, bring reason as an ally and raise arguments against that wholesale division of power which is the root principle of

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democracy. Democracy, to be logical, should demand an equal division of power and distribution of rights. But it is this point which the opponents of democracy contest. Their contention is, though it is put in rather less plain language, that some individuals are better than "people", while others are not fit to be "people" at all. For instance, some constitutions have been built on a property qualification for citizenship and award the individuals one or more votes, *i.e.* power-units, according to their wealth. The old Prussian franchise was so manipulated in the interests of the rich, and the British plural voting, while it lasted, was a manifestation of the same principle. The real implication is that one rich man is really more of a "person" because he pays more taxes and carries more responsibilities than one poor man, and therefore deserves to have a bigger share of the power or rights divided among the people. In the same way to keep large bodies or classes of people disfranchised is to imply that they are not "people" at all. Up till 1918 women in this country, more than half the adult population, were classed with criminals and lunatics as not being persons when it came to the distribution of power in political life. Later they became political persons at the age of thirty. Obviously some age limit must be fixed for the beginning of citizenship; no one but a most fanatical believer in Natural Rights would advocate the enfranchisement of babies in arms or even of school children. Some people mature more quickly than others, but a general rule must be fixed, and the rational plan would be to give civic rights when we demand civic duties and responsibilities. Certainly to say, as we then did, that a man becomes

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one of the people at twenty-one and a woman at thirty was mere perversity. This folly was produced, of course, by a half-hearted compromise. It has since been abandoned—by Conservative action.

Efforts then are made to limit membership of the people on the grounds of wealth, age, and sex. Underlying much of the opposition to Woman Suffrage was the idea that physical strength should really be a determining factor when we are considering the apportionment of political power. Society, some said, is based on force, and as women cannot fight neither shall they vote. This argument was pitifully futile. Accept it and to be logical you must disfranchise all men over military age and all men unfit for service. In the second place a defensive force does not consist of infantry, but of many arms, and it depends entirely on the labours of those at home. Obviously the women in uniform and the munition workers were just as much instruments of force as the soldiers of the line. But such refutations of the argument are less to the point than giving it the lie direct. Society, as we have already seen, is not based on force, but on opinion. Government is not maintained in the long run by violence, but by common interest. For every individual who refrains from stealing simply because he is afraid of the policeman, there are thirty who refrain because they realise that promiscuous thieving would upset the whole structure of society. We keep to the left hand side in driving, not through fear of penalty, but through seeing the sense of common discipline. Force may at times be necessary to hold society together, though some people deny even this; that is not the same as saying that it is

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the basis of society. The very word denies it; the true cement of our fellowship is confidence. If we occasionally call in the doctor, that does not constitute him the cause and the foundation of our existence.

It is indeed an astonishing proof of confusion of thought that anyone who professes and calls himself a democrat should set to work to make arbitrary assumptions as to who the people are. We are not endeavouring to show that democracy is the best form of government, nor are we inquiring what is the best form of government. We are simply trying to discover what the word democracy implies. If a man believes that the limitation of power is essential to the salvation of society he is entitled to his belief. And he can limit it as he chooses, by sex, by wealth, by birth, or by age and strength. But he cannot fairly claim that he believes in government by the people. It is reasonable to assume that those who have put themselves outside the pale of society by criminal attacks upon it or by consistent neglect of its decisions should for contempt of social duties be deprived of social rights; or that those whom misfortune has put outside the pale by lunacy should have no claim for rights upon those who expect no responsibilities from them. But it is indeed hard to find a reason for making other distinctions as to membership of the people and for refusing a share of power to those who are poor or weak, while one is claiming to be democratic. The further excuse of the pseudo-democrat that it is dangerous to give power to the uneducated is reasonably met by a peremptory demand for general and thorough education.

To sum up, our argument has now carried us to

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the following point: Democracy is created when public opinion, ceasing to be tolerant of the tenure of political power (Actual Legal Sovereignty) by one man or by a few, passes to an active resolution that this power should be possessed by the people and therefore divided among the people. Accepting democracy, *i.e.* people's power, as one's ideal, there is no reason for denying to any sane, law-abiding adult membership of the people and the consequent possession of rights and duties. Thus, democracy, to be genuine, must be founded on the doctrine of equality.

CHAPTER FOUR

EQUALITY, EQUITY, AND NATURAL RIGHTS

“THE doctrine of human equality.” Another abstract phrase! Here again there is call for definition, if our method is to be maintained and the precision necessary to the subject is to be kept up. When a theorist proclaims to the world that all men are equal, what precisely does he mean? If he means by his war-cry that all men and women are equal and alike in character and capacity, then surely he is talking arrant nonsense. Not even the most fanatical doctrinaire could deny, for instance, that A is cleverer than B, and that B is cleverer than C, that D is self-controlled, while E is weak and unreliable, that F is physically a giant, while G is a puny weakling, that H has a good memory but cannot reason, while J has an acute mind but cannot remember what he is told. It takes all sorts to make a world, and there is no use blinding our eyes to the presence of all sorts. No sane man then could assert that all men are alike and mean that all men are equal. But sane men do assert the equality of man. When they do so they assert not equality of capacity, but equality of rights. They argue that when, according to the rule of democracy, power is taken from the few and divided among the many, it must be divided on the principle of equality. Each man or woman, they say, should have one voice and no one should have two. In the

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words of Jeremy Bentham, "Each to count for one, and no one for more than one" Why should this be so?

To that question two absolutely divergent answers have been given. On the one side is the doctrine of Natural Rights, which is historically connected with the French Revolution. The basis of this doctrine is the claim that every human being has by virtue of his humanity an absolute and inalienable right to certain things, among which would be freedom and equal treatment. The theory of Natural Rights is what is termed in the jargon of philosophy an "a priori" theory. That is to say it is based on fundamental assumptions which confessedly cannot be proved or referred for proof to the criterion of experience. These assumptions can be accepted or rejected, but those who believe in them are willing to accept them as they stand. Every problem of philosophy comes in the end to an a priori statement or judgment. A point is reached where something of vital importance has to be accepted without proof; or, of course, it can be rejected and then the structure of argument built on it falls to the ground. The mathematician can give no reason why two and two should make four. He accepts that principle and works on it. But if somebody could prove conclusively that two and two made five, the whole mathematical edifice, as at present constituted, would fall to the ground, and a new and different one would have to be constructed. So too in ethics, a study akin to politics, a direct or a priori judgment, incapable of proof, has somewhere to be made. Why should goodness, granted that we have an idea of what it is, be pursued?

We feel that it should, we say that it should, but we cannot prove that it should. We may make happiness the end of life, but why is it the end? Because we desire it. But why should our desires point out the end of life? They may be leading us astray. We have always to make somewhere in our philosophy a judgment that we cannot prove. But the question which divides philosophers is whether we should limit our a priori judgments as narrowly as possible or whether we may indulge ourselves and play with them freely.

To put it frankly the doctrine of Natural Rights makes hay with a priori judgments, and tosses statements without proof as freely as a harvester tosses his bundles. It almost gives us a picture of each baby being born with an invisible parcel of rights mysteriously attached to him. The baby has, because he is human, a right to this and a right to that. He has of course a right to equality among other things. At first this sounds specious enough, but consider the implications. How can a baby have a right to freedom when it certainly cannot look after itself? Freedom, after all, is a vague term, and carries with it the question, "Freedom to do what?" If a man has by virtue of his humanity the right to vote, has he the right to kill or to get violently drunk? "No, certainly not," comes the answer, "because he is interfering with the rights of others." But we can never settle where that interference begins except by some general and external principle, such as that of utility. He should not get drunk because it makes his wife miserable. If we continue to argue solely on the ground of rights we reach confusion at once.

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The man has a right to get drunk ; the wife has a right to be happy ; and the two things cannot coincide. One man has a right to kill ; the other has a right to live. There must be some principle of adjustment. The only sword to cut the Gordian knots tied by a doctrine of Natural Rights is the doctrine of general utility, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But if this sword is to be used, it might as well be used far earlier.

The doctrine of Natural Rights has about it a philosophical crudity that horrified both the conservative Whigs like Burke and the radical Utilitarians like Bentham. But like many philosophical crudities it contained a tremendous truth ; the truth of the doctrine of equality.

The argument, or rather the statement, that man is born with a large number of rights attached to him eternally and inalienably can easily be reduced to an absurdity. But that does not prove that he has no rights at all. We must make an *a priori* judgment somewhere, and here is the spot. Man surely is born with one supreme, irreducible right, the right to have rights or in other words the right to fair treatment and to equality of consideration. The various practical rights that should belong to men, women, and children, must be settled in the light of general utility or common happiness. Whether a man should be allowed by society to get drunk, or a woman to drug herself with the eternal teapot, whether children should be compulsorily educated or be allowed the freedom of entering industry when their parents wish to exploit them, whether a man should be forced to do in the interests of the community what he

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personally believes to be wrong—all these and similar questions must be answered, but they certainly cannot be settled by the admission of a large number of conflicting and inalienable rights. There must be accommodation, as the Utilitarians insisted, and this accommodation can be best carried out on the principle of creating the maximum of common happiness. But at the root of all such settlements must be an acknowledgment of the one great and vital right—the right to have rights. If the believers in Natural Rights had limited their creed to this one claim they would have been both practically and philosophically on firm soil. As it was they carried their doctrine to extreme lengths; but just because it was founded on essential truth it had a tremendous influence upon the world. The doctrine of Natural Rights, though it is crude philosophy, has often turned out to be good politics. For in the hands of its believers it has been a sturdy bludgeon against all kings, priests, and bureaucrats who would shackle and confine the free activities of the human spirit and restrict the goodness of life in their own particular interests.

The Utilitarians, though bitterly opposed to a priori methods of thought, worked in many ways for ends identical with those of the Natural Right doctrinaires. Their efforts as reformers were unbounded, and, although they attached themselves to an economic theory of *laissez-faire*, which ultimately proved to be destructive of the “greatest happiness” at which they aimed, they did fine work during the first half of last century in securing the reform, long overdue, of the antiquated and barbarous Legal and Penal System. The fact that Carlyle scoffed at Benthamism

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as "gross" is but a proof that Carlyle sometimes wrote before he thought. The Utilitarians attacked the institution of slavery, for instance, on practical, not on a priori grounds. They attacked it because it was detrimental to the common good and because it destroyed the happiness of men, while the a priorists attacked it on the ground of Natural Right. While one side showed that slavery was stupid, the other showed it was wrong. From this it can be easily seen how men may come to similar and beneficial results by very different roads.

This brings us back to the question of equality. Against the doctrinaire statement that men are born equal and cannot be made unequal, the Utilitarians replied that men are born unequal and very easily kept unequal; that equality is not born but made, and that the reason for making it is that it promotes happiness. If it ceases to promote it, then it is time to destroy it, rights or no rights. Democracy to the Utilitarian is the true method of politics, not because of anything sacred inherent in it, but because it is the political system which experience has shown to be the best creator of happiness. The voice of the people is not the voice of God, infallible and irresistible, but the surest guide to the goal of common welfare. Equality, again, to them, has nothing sacred or mystic about it, but it is the true method of democracy because it is the only method that works. Statesmanship is concerned with vast numbers of people; it has neither the time nor the knowledge to start drawing fine distinctions. However reasonable it may seem at first sight to try to sort the sheep from the goats, to realise that A is an able and a conscientious citizen,

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while B is a stupid and a lazy self-seeker, and to reward A with two votes or power-units and B with none, humanity is not so easily classified.

The statesman is faced with C and D and E, all different types, neither very good nor very bad. Not only are comparisons of this kind odious, they are impossible. No man, not even the mightiest of Whitehall panjandrums and most God-gifted of bureaucrats, is omniscient, and therefore no man or body of men can fairly arrange how democratic power should be split up, save on some rough and ready rule. The simplest rule is that of equality. It soon becomes obvious that the only feasible method for the statesman is to treat all men alike, not because they are really alike, but because distinctions, invidious among individuals, become impossible among a million. The doctrine of human equality, even in the severely Utilitarian form here given to it, may seem to be a glaring piece of folly, but taking all in all it is the only way of getting on with practical politics. Philosophically it is a fiction, but it is a fiction that works.

We must be careful here to distinguish between equality and equity. The law treats men theoretically as equals, but this leads to unfairness in individual cases, as circumstances alter those cases. When equality thus fails to provide justice, equity is called in to physic it. Equitable treatment is based on equality of consideration or equality of opportunity. This may sound hard and involved, but an instance will make it plain. Suppose a father is making his will, and he has two sons to consider. He has saved his money with difficulty, and naturally wishes to put

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it to the best use. The elder son has shown himself to be a hopeless profligate and may be relied upon to squander any money that comes his way at the earliest opportunity and in the least productive manner. The younger son is ambitious and careful in a reasonable degree. He would spend his money on further education and on travel; he is eager to make a good start in life. Here equal treatment would give fifty per cent. of the money to each son; equitable treatment would surely give a greater share, if not all, to the younger. It would be equal treatment to divide a cake among a family so that each had a piece of the same size. But what would satisfy the appetite of the eldest son would certainly make the baby sick. Equity, which is simply equality tempered with justice, might solve the problem more helpfully. The baby might, and probably would, complain that he was being cheated by allotment of a tiny slice; he has not had equality, but he has had equality of consideration; and he will be spared a vomit.

But equity, however desirable it may be, cannot be applied to politics on a large scale. A father making his will can fairly draw distinctions because he knows all the relevant facts. But a statesman cannot possibly know anything in detail about the million or more with whom he has to deal; they are just so many units to him. He can make a few rough divisions into classes, but even these are usually unsatisfactory; he cannot attempt to judge between the myriad individuals. He can allot Old Age Pensions to all below a certain degree of wealth and over a certain age. But he cannot constitute himself a moral judge and begin to except those whose poverty

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is due to their own thriftlessness and folly, and therefore have no just claim on their fellows. The fact is that in dealing with these large numbers he cannot possibly tell where misfortune ends and misconduct begins. Equity is inapplicable to millions.

In default of equity we must have equality. Efforts are made to introduce equity into political measures, but only by the division into classes, not by giving separate treatment to separate individuals. In the case of the income-tax there are complicated efforts to be equitable by means of rebates, allowances, exemptions, and so on; but this does not mean that there is not much injustice to individuals. It is always desirable to advance equity, if it can be done efficiently. But the trouble is that it cannot. Classification might be carried further, and a more accurate grading and apportionment of the income-tax is eminently desirable and probably feasible. The Tribunals of 1916 were supposed to introduce equity into the equality of conscription, but they were not a great success. The fault lay not in themselves, but in the enormity of their task. They were endeavouring to introduce equity where it is notoriously impossible to do so with any accuracy; they were endeavouring to make fair individual judgments where they could do no more than classify.

In any community the law takes up a situation in the midst. It is always behind the most advanced opinion and in advance of the most reactionary. Because it cannot distinguish between one man and another it is bound to be unfair. But if it tried to do so the result would be worse. In aristocratic and

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plutocratic communities the dice used often to be loaded against the poor, whose ignorance of technicalities renders them unable to defend themselves. But even if the law were administered with complete absence of bias, it would always be unfair, because it must make rough divisions which do not represent the intricacies of human nature. Men are not either innocent or guilty, honest or thieves. The law cannot concern itself with motives as much as with results, although from the strictly ethical point of view the would-be murderer who could not make his pistol go off is distinctly worse than the man-slaughterer whose pistol went off by mistake. The law cannot allow ignorance of the law to be an excuse, though from the ethical stand-point it may be a very fair one.

All classification is busy telling lies while it is busy telling truths ; and the law is a great classifier. The law, in fact, representing the principle of equality, makes blunders ; for men are not equal or alike. But no one has yet shown any better way of dealing with large numbers than to deem them equal. And so democracy must accept equality, not because it is a sacred principle, but because there is no sacred principle. In dealing with a nation, statesmen must aim at equity as far as possible ; but as a rule they must fall back upon equality, because they will find out in time that it is the only true equity.

It would be as well to sum up this argument as far as it has gone, even at the obvious risk of being tedious. But there is no greater fault in a book than vagueness and an inconsequent jumping to and fro. At the close of the last chapter we held that democracy reigns when public opinion, ceasing to be tolerant of the

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usurpation of political power (Actual Legal Sovereignty) by one man or by few, insists on the possession of this power by the people and therefore on its division among the people. There is no reason for limiting membership of "the people", though many such limitations have been made, and democracy to be genuine must be founded on the doctrine of equality. Let us now add this: "By equality we do not mean that everybody is alike or that every one is born into the world with a certain number of natural, inalienable rights; but simply that in the division of power and of happiness at which democracy aims, 'each must count for one, and no one for more than one', because this is the only working method. Equity is useful to remedy defects in the law or in the economic structure of society, but must be carefully watched because it may be the tool of interested parties. On the whole it will be found that in the distribution of power the principle of equality is essential because no other method can possibly deal with large masses of people."

CHAPTER FIVE

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

HAVING accepted the principle of equality as the basis of a democratic division of power, we are by no means out of the wood. Rather are we but entering its most tangled undergrowth. Where "the people" in question happen to be comparatively few, then direct legislation can obviously be effected by a mass meeting of the people; this was done in the case of the Athenian democracy, where the supreme body was the meeting of the citizens, at which any possessor of full civic rights could speak and vote. And the same solution of the problem is possible nowadays when democracy is the method of government chosen by a small group of people associated for any purpose; the supreme body of such a group may be the general meeting attended by all members, each possessing one voice and one vote. Its decisions are recorded by a count, and in such a case it may fairly be claimed that power is divided equally among all.

But, even in so simple a form of government, the principle of election, carrying with it an inevitable delegation of power, must be introduced. For an assembly of people, however keen and however intelligent, cannot do more than assent to, or dissent from, a series of proposals put before it. When

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some policy has been finally accepted, the assembly itself cannot be the agent or executor of that policy. It must create for itself an executive official or body of officials. These agents, if the practice is to conform with democratic theory, should be elected by the individual members of the assembly, and should naturally be responsible to the assembly for their subsequent conduct and their success or failure in giving effect to the policy which has been decided upon. These officials are, in a true sense, representatives of the people, and representation is thus seen to be an inevitable element of even the simplest forms of democracy.

But in all the great communities of modern times the number of citizens, even allowing for those limitations of the franchise which we saw to be so frequent and so inconsistent with democratic theory, is far too great and the territories inhabited are far too large to permit of the possibility of legislation by mass meeting. Furthermore, if the legislature were to meet frequently—as indeed it must do in a large, busy, and highly organised community—the citizens would not be able to attend without neglecting their daily occupation. (At Athens this difficulty was remedied by the existence and the use of a large body of slaves.) For many reasons, therefore, election has to be introduced, not only into the creation of executive bodies, but also into the creation of legislative assemblies. To this practice we are all so hardened that it may seem the most natural thing in the world. We are well used to the division of countries into “constituencies”, each returning its own member or members to Senate or Parliament. This is, of

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course, an obvious and simple device for escaping from an obvious difficulty. Yet here, again, we must beware of over-simplification. Men are apt to use the words "representative government" as if the phrase were some magic elixir of democratic political life. But representative government, common enough in spurious forms, is, in its purity, a rare specimen for the treasure hunter. It is a goal not easily won.

There are three main problems which face citizens who, not content with the mouthing of fine phrases, set out to make the equal division of people's power through representation a definite reality in political life. On the one hand, that queer farrago of conflicting traditions, instincts, superstitions, and desires, which constitutes public opinion, is not easily rendered articulate. Thus, when men attempt to build up a legislative body which may be an accurate echoing-board for the voice of the people, they are faced with a task of immense complexity. What if the people have no voice, but only a muddled murmur? Efforts to articulate that murmur may lead to the tyranny of mechanised politics and the triumph of a self-seeking political boss

In the second place, provided the people can make a voice distinctly heard, it is imperative to devise machinery for letting it ring out clear and true. Our modern British Parliaments, without Proportional Representation, may be the servants of the people, but they do not accurately express their master's voice. In translating the theory of representative government into practice there are many slips. And, in the third place, there is the problem, not merely of getting a

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fair result by election, but of keeping a curb upon the elected. Executive officials, indeed all elected persons, are notoriously troublesome people. They may owe their position primarily to the votes of their masters, but their lofty posts carry such tremendous power with them that they may swiftly and easily forget the source of that power. Few lines of Shakespeare are more often quoted than his immortal portrait of the assuming official :

Dressed in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence—like an angry ape—
Plays such fantastic tricks upon high heaven,
As makes the angels weep.

“The never-ending audacity of elected persons” at which Walt Whitman protested, is just as formidable a menace to the cause of people's power as the audacity of an unelected and irresponsible tyranny. Indeed, of the two, the former, being more subtle and having on its side the technicalities of law, is really the more difficult to overcome.

Let us first deal with the question of obtaining an accurate mirror of public opinion in the legislative system. Plainly this is essential to democracy as we have defined it; equally plainly it is scarcely ever achieved. Grant the existence of a free and complete adult suffrage for the expression of public opinion; grant, that is to say, an equality in the primary division of power; yet that is only the beginning. Nations or political units are then divided up into constituencies and each constituency has one or more shares of the legislature allotted to it; its inhabitants

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proceed at settled intervals to elect a member or members. In that apparently simple process considerable complications arise. Let us suppose the constituency has only one allotted seat, and three or more candidates compete for it; A polls 5,000, B 4,000, and C 3,000; then, according to the prevailing law of Great Britain, A is returned as victorious member but he represents a minority of his constituents. Such happenings will naturally re-act upon the total composition of the legislature. It is, of course, possible for every single seat in the legislature to be held by a minority-vote member. What then becomes of representative government?

Again, we must bear in mind that a narrow victory counts as much as an easy one; it wins the prize, and the prize, whether it is earned by one vote or five thousand, is a seat and a vote in the legislature. Consequently, if one particular party were to win a great many seats by small majorities or split votes, while the other won comparatively few, but always with large majorities, the very reverse of true representation would result. A majority of voters could have a minority of members and a government could be legally formed and set in power in direct opposition to the wishes of the people. This is no idle fancy of a theorist; it did actually happen in Great Britain in 1886, when the Home Rulers won 283 seats with 2,103,954 votes, while the Unionists had 387 seats with 2,049,137 votes. In 1874, the Conservatives had 356 seats with 1,222,000 votes, and the Liberals and Radicals had 296 seats with 1,436,000 votes. In 1924 the sweeping Conservative majority in Parliament represented a minority in the country, but on this

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occasion the three-party system was the cause of the trouble. The Labour majority of 1945 was out of all proportion to the votes polled and in 1949 the Labour Party managed to snatch control of the London County Council although they polled over 100,000 less votes than their opponents. This travesty of democracy shocked many democrats in Labour's own ranks, but was actually defended by a leading member of the Labour Cabinet, Mr. Herbert Morrison.

And so far we have been taking for granted that all constituencies carry equal numbers of voters, which is, of course, only roughly true after one of our periodical redistributions. In the elections of 1910, there were constituencies with electorates varying from three to forty thousand in number. It is very difficult to keep pace with changes of population, try as we will to adopt the political unit fairly to the population unit. Truly, our optimistic democrats have a mighty faith in the goddess Fortune! Elections carried on under such conditions are comparable only to games of chance, and are the merest rattling of political dice. We talk of public opinion, but public opinion, even when most rudely articulated, contains a majority and a minority view. Under our present system of conducting elections minorities are in a hopeless position. Suppose that in all six hundred constituencies of a country there was an average group of one thousand voters who stood strongly and unwaveringly for one particular policy. Perhaps they would not win a single seat and the ensuing Parliament would not offer them the scantiest representation. But there would still be six hundred

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thousand of them in the country, voiceless as far as legislative action was concerned. This would not only be grossly unfair to the voters themselves, but a grave loss to the country in as far as the formulation and expression of new ideas are essential spurs to progress. Even the best democrats, fervent believers in majority rule, will admit that minorities are often the salt of the earth.

Now these evils can be at least remedied, if not permanently removed. Practical proposals have been made for the Second Ballot, the Alternative Vote, and Proportional Representation. It is not our business to discuss their relative advantages in a book concerned simply with the meaning of democracy. These solutions of an immense problem have their own particular literature, their own ardent advocates, and their own bitter critics. To investigate these intricacies is a task vitally necessary for the practical politician and every citizen must be prepared to do so at one time or another. For the present, it is sufficient to demonstrate that before we can expect to make the division of power among the people a reality by representative government, we have to consider all these details of political machinery, to face a number of sometimes contradictory facts, and to come to a decision. Phrases certainly are no use.

The complexities so far mentioned are all soluble. It remains for our political thinkers and our statesmen in the legislature to evolve a scheme of representation which should be fair and just. But there are other difficulties which are in their very nature incapable of a perfect solution. For instance, no man of eclectic views, no man whose sympathies do not run parallel

with the straight rulings of party, can be adequately represented. Yet he is probably a citizen of value to the State, for there are no greater political virtues than critical power and independence of judgment. It is possible for a man to support particular measures in the programme of all parties, but he must vote for an out-and-out supporter of one party. Perhaps some independent member of the assembly, a person who continues to grow sadly more rare, may be his real representative, but that is entirely a matter of chance. In this respect, the mirror of public opinion can never be, even under the most favourable circumstances, strictly accurate. Inevitably we are dealing with rough likenesses, not photographs; that is the constant limitation of political life, as we saw in our discussion of equality and equity. Consequently it is mere waste of time to trouble over much about a detailed accuracy; the more pressing task is to prevent the appearance of complete distortions.

The Party System is in this country the object of much bitter criticism. Such criticism is not unnatural considering our present discontents; but it is really the accretions to that system due to the degradation of political life by sectional interests, rather than the system itself, which have caused the trouble and the consequent resentment. Yet the Party System has one great justification. The myriad streams of social and political ideas do naturally run into two or three main channels. Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism do represent different and coherent groups of ideals, and those who accept one group do frequently and honestly accept it without reserve. The Party System would never have attained such a tremendous

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hold on the country if it had not been consonant with human nature. As the sentry sings in "Iolanthe":

Every boy and every gal
That's born into this world alive,
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative.

Add "Socialist" to bring the ditty up to date, and there is certainly truth in it. And if this is true, if the rough mass of public opinion does really show these fairly definite strata, then the Party System is not a mere imposition upon tolerant, foolish people, but a genuine piece of machinery for the production of representative government. Coalitions are artificial and usually unpopular. The fruit of a crisis, they wither in the normal weather of politics. The reason is simple: they are unnatural.

But the evils of the Party System are a living parable to all men who make machines. Devising servants, they make only masters. In this case the System devours the Party. Every group must have leaders, every association its executive officials, parties included. Organisation, too, is essential, and organisation means money. When private wealth was far greater than it is to-day the necessary funds were supplied to the Capitalist parties by rich men, and the rich men, having paid the piper, proceeded to call the tune. In the same way, Labour politics are largely controlled by the only holders of funds on that side, namely, the Trade Unions, who naturally prefer financing their own candidates to paying for the campaigns of outsiders. Party financiers begin to control policy. It is worth their while to control the political party machine, because by so doing they can

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suppress awkward proposals and elicit sympathetic administration. It may be a highly profitable investment for a group of manufacturers or a big Trade Union to have a kept or tame politician in the House of Commons.

The politician owes his position to his party, and his party owes its position to its funds, and thus to the big units of Capital or Labour. Consequently the machine instead of being controlled democratically from below, is controlled autocratically from above. The voter at an election does not settle what the issues are to be between which he must decide. With him it is a case of take the party programme or leave it. The moulding of Socialism or of Conservatism falls, under present conditions, to the people who pay. Party-thinking is inherent in human nature, and party-thinking makes party action. But party action under plutocratic conditions destroys both thought and humanity. (The Trade Unions, with their political levy restored, are now plutocratic bodies of great wealth and power.) As new machinery is always hailed with delight as the great saver of labour, and ends by making us all toil harder than ever, so the Party System, which begins well enough, ends by destroying all the genuine and valuable elements of partisan conflict.

Who, then, is to blame? Plutocracy, we are told, is the criminal, and we are confronted with the immutable economic law whereby economic precedes political power. Into that contention we shall have reason to inquire later. But it is also true and also relevant that the individual members of the various parties do give their support to the programmes

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before them. If they strenuously objected, they could make their constituency associations take action. As we originally saw, government is a matter of opinion, and if the opinion of party-members is tolerant of party-bosses, some share of the blame for the social distemper must fall upon these members. Complaints are raised because strange job-hunters from London, whose chief experience is of intrigue in the political clubs, are posted to contest country seats over the heads of local candidates; and such complaints are rightly raised. But why only complaints? If the local partisans meant business, they could send these careerists packing. The Party System, like any organised system is not necessarily undemocratic in itself, but it easily becomes a hunting-ground for place-men and wire-pullers, when the mass of party-members are lazy, uncritical, unalert, and only goaded to a momentary enthusiasm by the spur of a sudden election.

The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices
Make instruments to plague us.

The pleasant vice of the man in the street, as far as politics are concerned, is sleep.

In conclusion, then, we may say that the legal division of power among the people essential to democracy demands, wherever large numbers of people are being dealt with, the procedure known as representative government. But the achievement of fair and complete representation is extraordinarily difficult. In the first place, the electoral system must be carefully devised to ensure that the winning side

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do not win by fortune alone, but have a definite majority of votes behind them. Secondly, their majority in the assembly must harmonise with their majority in the country, and minorities must have, in the familiar words of diplomacy, "adequate guarantees". This, of course, applies not only to nations, but to any associations of men and women which are supposed to be democratically controlled. We must realise, however, that political life deals broadly with broad issues, and that men who pick and choose their measures with a delicate eclecticism will, however justifiable their choice, find scant representation in the rough and ready working of a large assembly. Parties are inevitable, for they have their roots in human nature, but they are infinitely dangerous when mechanised, and are capable of becoming, as indeed are all machines, the merciless masters of mankind. For this, however, the responsibility lies largely with the inert multitude whose political enthusiasm lives and dies with the excitement of a General Election. How often must they be reminded that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance?

These are the difficulties in the way of electing an assembly that may fairly represent public opinion. We have next to consider the problems that arise in the effort to keep a salutary check on the vagaries of elected persons. It is not enough to elect genuine representatives; we have to be sure that they continue to represent.

CHAPTER SIX

DEMOCRATIC GUARANTEES.—(1) LEGISLATIVE BODIES

WE have seen that "people's power" demands a very searching inquiry into the methods of representation and a most careful construction of the legislative machinery. It is not enough to cry "Democracy" and to suppose that by some magic the people's will can be transmitted into laws. But even supposing that a democracy has built up for itself a legislative body in which the grosser forms of misrepresentation are impossible, suppose that it can confidently rely on any election returning a majority to power in accordance with the people's desires, that does not prove that the majority will fulfil those desires and carry out their particular mandate. They may be elected on one issue, and immediately neglect it; they may also go on from sins of omission to sins of commission, and pass into laws measures amenable to themselves as individuals but repulsive to the electors, measures for which they have no vestige of authority. It is one thing to choose servants; it is another thing to make them do your bidding.

This is by no means a mere academic difficulty, propounded for the sake of argument. It is a common problem in all working governments, a grave and

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constant difficulty in that realisation of people's power which is the essence of democracy. We have already traced the many steps of thought and action that must be taken in order to translate "democracy" from being a beautiful and inspiring word into an actual and enjoyable fact. Here, then, when the cup seems near at last to the lip, the slip is most frequent and most fatal. The danger is two-fold. In the first place, there is the question of supervising the work of legislative bodies and keeping them in close touch with the opinions of the electorate; in the second, is the even more formidable duty of keeping a firm hand on the activities of executive officials. This latter task is rendered most arduous because the actions of an official are far less easy to trace and to control than the more public deliberation and legislation of a Parliament. In each case, however, a loss of "democratic control" is always fatal to the cause of people's power.

Let us deal first with the legislative body. Obviously the whole question is confused by the vagueness, not so much of the word "representative", but of the fact for which it stands. The elector can only choose his representative on one or few issues; but if that representative is to sit in a national parliament, whose duty it is to deal with a vast multitude of issues, he cannot possibly consult his constituents on every decision which he makes and every vote which he records. It is true that, if he is returned as a member of one particular party, he may reasonably support all measures that are in harmony with the underlying ideas of his party, be it Conservative, Liberal, or Socialist. But, unfortunately, life is not so simple

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as all that, nor are measures so readily classified. Issues are bound to arise, where party formulae and party philosophies have nothing or little to do with the case. What, then, is the honest representative to do? He cannot keep running backwards and forwards between constituency and legislature; he cannot hold a post-card ballot of his electors on every chance division; he can, and should, do his best to keep in touch with his masters by visits and discussions. But beyond this he cannot go. He must after this use his own discretion; he must vote as seems right to him.

This is the basis of the theory of representation as opposed to the theory of delegation. It was put forward very strongly by Edmund Burke to his Bristol constituents:

“Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinions high respect, their business unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasure, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases to prefer their interest to his own. But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. Your representative owes you not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.

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"My worthy colleague says, his will ought to be subservient to yours. If that be all, the thing is innocent. If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment and not of inclination; and what sort of reason is that in which the determination precedes the discussion, in which one set of men deliberate and another decide, and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the argument? . . . Authoritative instructions, mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest convictions of his judgment and conscience, these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our Constitution."¹

This attitude is plainly adventurous. In the hands of a lazy or an unscrupulous man, or an obstinate representative, such power may be abused, in which case the fair realisation of people's power becomes impossible of achievement. It is for that reason that many people, who are keen democrats, support the alternative of delegation. A delegate differs from a representative in that he has his marching orders accurately laid out. He is not told to go to Liberalism and to find his own way there; he is given the paths

¹ Speech at the conclusion of the Poll.

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and routes which he must take. In the case of a conference called for a special purpose, the sending of delegates is the obvious and proper course. In such cases the problem is simple and must be simply dealt with. If a large Trade Union holds a conference to decide whether or not to strike, plainly the sending of delegates with strict orders from each branch is the proper method. With the system of delegation often goes the card-vote, whereby the voting-power of each delegate is in proportion to the number of his electors. When he votes for one proposal his vote is considered as one hundred or one thousand votes, or whatever the number of his electors may be. Such a scheme is made necessary where the branches of Trade Unions vary greatly in strength. It holds good, for instance, at the Trade Union Conference, where both the card-vote and the block-vote are in use.

But, just as delegation has its very obvious advantages under specific circumstances, so it has its very obvious limitations. This is notably true of a national parliament. Delegation fails there, because it is impossible. Where new issues are constantly arising, it is not feasible for a constituency to give its representative anything but a vague mandate. For good or ill, it must make the best of its man and trust to his being an honourable and a reliable servant. For this reason electors should consider far more than they do the personal character and capacity of a candidate rather than his loyalty to party or his faithfulness on one big issue. It is true that "party loyalty" may often govern his decisions; but it is equally true that what every legislature called on to

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deal widely with wide issues requires is men of strong imagination, critical power, and fearless independence. Such qualities are killed by delegation. In a truly representative body they would have free play. Of course, from the strict standpoint of people's power, they may be dangerous. But so are all good things. Quality and risk are constant company.

Above all, it must be emphasised again that in this question of representation, absolute accuracy is beyond achievement. We can only aim at rough results, eliminate the more apparent obstacles, and hope for the best. If one member takes an independent view, as, once elected, he has a perfect legal right to do under our representative system, he may not represent the majority in his constituency, but he may represent a minority in a great many other constituencies who would otherwise go unrepresented. Probably very few "pacific" members of a Parliament represent the views of a majority of their constituents during a war, but they may represent a quite appreciable minority in the country which would otherwise never be heard. And in many other cases the action of an independent member may really be "democratic" on the whole, though a system of delegation would show him to be out of touch with his particular constituency. It is true that there is a risk of representation going very much astray, but the remedy for this risk is choice of members who are honourable and disinterested as well as independent. In dealing with whole nations and with millions one can but work roughly to rough results; delegation has its obvious uses, and its

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obvious limitations ; representation is the only general method, but it demands for the winning of true people's power both principle in the candidate and vigilance in the electorate.

Let us return now from the individual member to the general legislative body. Here, too, some guarantee must be demanded against usurpation of unauthorised power. It has usually been supposed that the easiest and fairest method is to impose a time-limit upon the life of the elected assembly. Obviously some such limit must be set, for it would be madness to elect a Parliament and then leave it to legislate for twenty or thirty years without further advice from the electorate. Some term must be arranged, but what term? It would seem, at first thought, that the shorter the term the more "democratic" would be the assembly, that is to say, the more real would be the influence of the sovereign people over its elected servants. That is why the radical agitators of English history used to demand "annual parliaments".

But a number of other important things has to be considered. The world's work has got to be done, and the imposition of too many checks and guarantees, though well and truly calculated to safeguard the realities of democracy, may have, on the whole, a deleterious effect. As the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath, so democracy is planned for good government, not good government for the abstract ideal of democracy. And good government should aim at the happiness (broadly interpreted) or welfare of the community. Therefore if it is found that democratic machinery is becoming obstructive

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by its bulk, then it must be reduced in the common interest. A General Election, for instance, means a grave dislocation of national business. If it diverts much money and energy, if it takes away the most valuable people in the community from their occupations and dislocates their activities, if it is an immense demand on the time and money of individuals and organisations who cannot spare either, then General Elections may be too frequent and a sorry burden to the community. We have here to strike a mean and to work out on practical rather than doctrinaire lines the most suitable lifetime for our various assemblies.

The present arrangement for Great Britain is a five-year Parliament and three-year governing bodies for County and Municipal administration. The five-year Parliament in theory often becomes a four-year Parliament in practice and, as the Premier can usually force an election at will and may be driven to do so at an early date (*e.g.* 1910 and 1924) when his majority is small or uncertain, the average actual life of Parliament is not so large as the theoretical. This seems, on the whole, a just compromise. A party is usually elected to power on two or three large issues, to carry which into law will certainly take two or three years, Parliamentary procedure being what it is. If the party has a sweeping mandate for those measures, then it is not likely to deviate far from the people's will within two or three years. It may have, so to speak, a year to play with at the end, but the menace of an approaching election is some safeguard against a really unpopular proposal. The danger lies in a victory won by an appeal on a single

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issue, as the carrying on of a war (1900) or the making of a peace (1918). The Conservative party took advantage of a "khaki" electoral victory to force unpopular measures on the country, but the result was annihilation.

In the meantime by-elections do form at least a shadowy guarantee. They indicate the trend of opinion and throw a beam of light on the Damoclean sword that hangs over ministerial necks. They are not, of course, a drastic or effective guarantee, and ministers have a legal right to take as little notice of them as they please. But they are there. And they may, with the passage of time, sap a majority which is not of gigantic proportions. Moreover, their moral and political influence is often quite out of proportion to the numerical alterations which they bring about. It appears then, that the aim of the true democrat is to create machinery of representation which will keep the legislature in close touch with the popular will, while not continually hampering and interfering with the work-a-day life of the world. And, from the legislators' point of view, it is only just to give them time to do their duty without being rushed and a chance to elaborate their measures without constant interference. Thus too rigid a system of democratic checks and guarantees might, in the long run, be prejudicial to the common interest. The tribunes' veto in ancient Rome, whereby anyone of ten tribunes might hold up any legislation, was devised to safeguard the people; but it created such havoc and was so abused that it probably did the people more harm than good. Absolute accuracy of representation, as we have seen, is beyond our

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achievement; if, eager to achieve it, we elaborate our machinery overmuch, our efforts will be wasted in the eternal minding of machines.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DEMOCRATIC GUARANTEES

—(2) UPPER HOUSES AND DIRECT ACTION

IT cannot be over-emphasised that the purpose of this book is not the discussion in detail of various measures for promoting democracy, but the outlining of paths of thought. Each measure may have its own formidable literature and its own tortuous history, and for this reason defies treatment in an essay which attempts to be both just and comprehensive. What we can, however, attempt is to describe the general principles that must underlie any genuine effort to realise popular power, and to map out lines along which democratic thought should run.

For that reason we cannot possibly discuss in detail the proposals for the Referendum, Initiative, and the Recall. It is sufficient to say that the democrat who is disappointed with the working of representative government must take them carefully into consideration and study their effect, for instance, in Switzerland, a State that takes its democracy seriously. We must content ourselves with pointing out that the issue at stake is really one of principle. Do we believe that the expense, the trouble, and the possibilities of obstruction and delay inherent in an elaborate system of democratic checks outweigh the plain

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advantages of making our representative "mirror" more accurate? Would it not be possible to make use of these checks and to guarantee no chance of their abuse? These are not easy questions, but they are the kind of problems that must be for ever in the mind of him who believes strongly in the value of democracy.

The same holds true of Upper Houses or Second Chambers. What principle underlies the Bicameral Theory and how does it react upon our notion of democracy? Second Chambers may be roughly classified in two divisions, those which are simply repetitions of the popular assemblies, devised as checks, and those which exist in Federations to represent the federal units as opposed to individual or national interests. The first class are for the most part obstructionist bodies. Of Great Britain's existing House of Lords a consistent democrat would say that it has little power, and that it has no business to have any power at all. By the preamble of the Parliament Act, however, it was theoretically doomed. The events of 1948 have cut its trifling powers yet again. The really important question is whether it is worth our while, from the point of view of democratic theory, to set up a Second Chamber on electoral lines in its place. For here we are in a plain dilemma. If the Second Chamber is to be elected on a basis of democratic equality, then it should be a mere repetition of the House of Commons and is useless; if it is not to be thus constituted, it can hardly be democratic. The other possibilities are that it should be chosen on a functional or vocational plan, which would give every citizen two votes, one for the Commons as a

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resident in a district, and one for the Second Chamber as the member of a trade, craft, or profession. Or else, if Devolution is introduced into Great Britain with Home Rule for Scotland and Wales, as well as Northern Ireland, the Second Chamber could represent the constituent federal units and various local bodies and hold a position analogous to the Senate in Australia and the United States.

In either of these latter cases the Second Chamber would have a definite ground for existence and some positive purpose to fulfil. The Second Chamber, based on the idea of delay, nearly always does more harm than good. Its function being conservative in the best sense it tends to become conservative in the worst sense. It is liable to be captured by "interests" and because its constructive work is far less important than its destructive work it necessarily develops a narrow and illiberal atmosphere. What is valuable in political institutions is positive function: a Second Chamber should represent the citizens from a second standpoint, if it is to have a permanent value. A Federal Second Chamber has a very real use in upholding local and State interests against national intervention. It may act wrongly, but at least it has a *raison d'être*. The same would be true of a Functional Second Chamber, a joint assembly of professional associations, Trade Unions, etc. Many people think that vocational association is a thing so valuable both to the workers in an industry and to the community at large, that it would be a grave mistake to give it so unimportant a habitation as a Political Second Chamber. Guild Socialists, for instance, who wish to see functional representation put upon a direct

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level with regional representation, would never consent to see their Guild Congress put in so humble a position or vested only with the powers commonly attributed to Second Chambers. But this is not the place to discuss so complex an issue; the problem of the Upper House is, in principle, a simple one. From the point of view of democratic theory the community does not need two assemblies coming from the same electorate and exercising the same function. It may need two political assemblies, if there are two political interests involved, State interests and national interests: or, if vocational interests are not considered to be sufficiently important to justify a purely Industrial Parliament, it might be wise to have a Vocational Second Chamber. That, however, is a strongly disputed assumption, for it asserts that the regional interests of men are far more vital than their economic and professional interests. It declares that a subsidiary post in the political sphere is the proper place for the Industrial Parliament, whereas some modern democrats think that the Industrial Parliament, representing men in their productive capacity, should be at least co-equal with the Territorial Parliament, representing men as neighbours and consumers, and that the Ultimate Legal Sovereignty should lie in a joint committee of the two Houses. Here, then, are lines of thought, stretching far out into the unknown, which must be considered by the political theorist, who is eager to map out a scheme of genuine representative government.

Before we pass on from the question of setting checks on legislative bodies to the even more formid-

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able task of bridling executive officials, there is an aspect of the problem which has sprung recently into prominence and deserves investigation, not so much from the practical point of view of those who want to "get-a-move-on" as from our own standpoint as theorists of democracy. This is the movement towards Direct (Industrial) Action in political affairs. It is urged that if the workers cannot get the political measures they want from the Government and from Parliament, they can bring those unruly servants to their knees by using the strike weapon that has often proved so effective in Industrial disputes. In a country, like ours, lacking both Referendum and Recall, what power, it is asked, has an infuriated electorate to bring the Government to heel? Must it wait for a whole five years, if the elected representatives proceed immediately to break all their election pledges? It knows that they may shuffle out of trouble on a false issue with the lapse of time; only the remorseless logic of folded arms, the insistent challenge of the strike, can bring the Government to its senses—now. And time is often the essence of the matter.

Every appeal to economic force to settle a political issue is, in a very real sense, a revolution. That is no discredit to direct action, for revolutions are not necessarily discreditable things; many of the governmental reforms and industrial liberties, which nearly all men acknowledge to be good, were won by revolutionary action. But it is essential to realise that revolution must be an occasional medicine, not an ordinary diet. The world may live by revolutions, but it can never live on them. The basis of all social

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life is mutual confidence and the tacit agreement to abide by rules and play the game. Direct action is a breach of the rules and it can only be justified by a preceding breach of the rules. Even so, it were far better to avoid it, if possible. The reasons for this are obvious.

Direct action can only be used successfully by those whose economic position gives them a strangle-hold upon the community. It may take the form of a general strike or of a strike by a powerful section of the workers. Clearly the former type of direct action is more democratic. There is no justification for any group of workers in a dominant position (*e.g.* the Miners, Railwaymen, and Transport Workers) using that position to enforce a political object unless they are really voicing the general will as against arbitrary action by the Government of the day. But if they are so convinced, would not a general political strike by all the workers be a better method? This would at least destroy the accusation that a section is trying to enforce its own sectional interests. But, if the general will is really active on the subject in question, it is possible, if not probable, that a big political agitation and propaganda, rendered irresistibly convincing by its universality, would succeed in moving the Government. And, if the question could be thus settled, it would certainly be the better way of achieving it: for the adoption of direct action as a regular political method is undemocratic, just because it destroys all possibility of political equality and places particular powers in the hands of special industries. The transport workers, for instance, would naturally be far more politically powerful than

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the school-teachers, a state of affairs most ridiculous to democratic theory. Moreover, the adoption of economic action by the workers would leave them without the right to protest against similar conduct on the part of the employers. It is possible, that should Labour win sweeping political power at the polls, Big Business could, by direct action, make it almost impossible for them to carry on government. This would be disgraceful, if Labour had a clear and undisputed majority in the country, but Labour would not be in a strong position for denunciation, if it was already guilty of similar practices. About direct industrial action in political affairs one feels that, if the community were genuinely and unitedly opposed to the conduct of the Government, it could, in most cases, achieve its ends by a political campaign : if the community did not feel and act in unison on the point in question, then there is no case for direct action.

But it must be noted that this statement carries a limitation, " in most cases ". It is a historical fact that Governments have often refused to listen to constitutional pleas and have been forced, and rightly forced, to yield to violence or the threat of it. We owe our Reform Bill of 1832 to direct action : we owe the abolition of monarchical despotism to direct action : America owes its primary freedom to direct action. Law and order is an essential of social life, but it can be bought at too great a cost. To bring the legal sovereign into constant contempt is to upset the whole basis of a community, but it may at times be a moral duty to act illegally. The truth that underlies the fiction of a social contract is that government rests

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upon agreement. We give our rulers powers on the understanding that they are going to do certain things: that is our tacit contract. If they refuse to do these things, if they laugh at protests and abuse their legal sovereignty for immoral ends, then it is they who have broken the social contract, they who justify an appeal to direct action. There are limits to human endurance. For the sake of keeping up our social life with all its tremendous advantages, the governed must stay their hands from wanton attacks upon the political system: but for the sake of their own self-respect they must remember their rights.

It is left, then, to the individual judgment to decide at what point the Government has broken all bounds of decency and must be fought tooth and nail. Individual temperament and proclivity will mould individual judgment; one man will emphasise the vital necessity to a community of keeping law and order and maintaining, even at a heavy cost of inconvenience, the constitutional fabric; another will feel that the risks of anarchy have been overrated and that the horrors of strife are balanced by the horrors of an irresponsible despotism. It is on these lines that the average citizen will have to make up his mind when the crisis comes. He will have to contrast in his judgment two things of value; on the one side the necessity of making representative government a reality and keeping the licence of elected people in subjection, on the other the immense hazard of introducing revolutionary methods into the sphere of civic life, the very essence of which is the substitution of public law for individual caprice. The issue may often be complicated. It will be disputed,

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for instance, whether the particular case has not an economic side ; and few people now dispute the right to use economic weapons in economic strife. Or it may be argued that, under a capitalist system, industrialists may control the political machine and employ direct action in subtle and secret forms by way of pressure on Ministers. Through all this maze of argument the seeker for true democracy must force his way, but in the end he will always come up against the same problem. Is this a case where a moral man would do his best, in the common cause, to defy the legal sovereign ? And that question he must answer for himself. We can only tell him that history has shown us some righteous revolutions : but that a revolution is a desperate measure and that desperate measures, like high explosives, may react very nastily on those who handle them.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DEMOCRATIC GUARANTEES—(3) THE OFFICIAL

LEGISLATION is, at best, a cumbrous and lengthy affair. In Great Britain a Bill must be read three times and passed through Committee in two Houses before it receives the King's assent and, becoming an Act, takes its place among the laws of the land. Even a hustled measure, passed with Opposition consent, cannot entirely avoid publicity, and with publicity comes discussion. The measure may in certain circumstances be flagrantly unpopular, but at any rate the public can watch the events and take note of them with a view to future action, even if it cannot prevent them at the time. But executive action is instantaneous: only its results are lasting. An official can cause in a few minutes a war that will last for years, and that official will be the last person to fight in it or even to suffer by it. Another official may casually spend in a day what an army of taxpayers contributes with labour in a year, and no one hears of the expenditure until the bill comes in. Truly the "never-ending audacity of elected persons" is the bane of democracy, and the popular control of executive power the thorniest problem to be faced by the democrat.

The immense difficulty of controlling the executive official can best be realised by a glance at one concrete

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example, the government and administration of Great Britain. According to the theory of our Constitution the executive power is dependent upon and responsible to the legislature; a sound and salutary theory, since the legislature is, in its turn, dependent upon and responsible to the electorate. But things do not, unfortunately, work out in so simple a fashion. The connecting link between the administration and the legislature is the Minister who is both a Member of Parliament and in charge of an Executive Department. But the Minister himself is only democratically appointed in a remote degree. He is appointed by the Prime Minister, who in turn is usually the leading member of the party which holds a majority. How he came to be leading member is frequently complicated and not particularly "democratic" history. So the Minister is only appointed by popular vote, in so far as he has made his way to the front, by fair means or foul, of the party which has recently won a general election. But, after all, what matters is not men but measures. Be the Minister who he may or whence he may, he is answerable to the legislature for the lawful, economical, and honourable management of one Department of State.

He is "answerable to the legislature". But how can that responsibility be enforced? In the first place questions may be put to him by members on the working of his department, and an irrepressible heckler may make himself a genuine nuisance. Ministers are to a certain extent afraid of persistent questioning about blunders and misdemeanours, but questions can as a rule be evaded or diplomatically answered.

Answers to questions do find their way into print and may even reach disgusted electors. But Ministers soon learn the ways and means of silence and evasion. The second guarantee is a motion for reducing the Minister's salary, which is in fact a vote of censure. Under one form of Cabinet Government the fate of one Minister is the fate of all. If one is censured, all must resign. An error in cordite blew the Liberal Government to pieces in 1895. That is the meaning of collective ministerial responsibility.

Consequently the passing of a vote of censure by the House of Commons is a very serious matter. It will probably entail a General Election, which for the average member is a costly, arduous, and risky affair. He, therefore, is in no mood to see votes of censure passed and will have every temptation to ensure that no such disaster takes place, be the misdemeanours of the Minister or his departmental officials never so grave. A policy of hush-hush is to the advantage of everyone, save the tax-paying elector, who will have to pay the bill to cover up the blunder. Of course, the mere fact that a vote of censure has been moved may do the Minister in question a certain amount of harm as far as his reputation goes, but ministerial skins soon become remarkably thick. To put the matter roughly, a vote of censure is very rarely passed, and as a method of safeguarding the interests of the people against the incompetence or dishonesty of officialdom it is extremely inadequate.

It will be seen then that the executive official stands in an extremely strong position. He is shielded by a Minister who is in turn shielded by a Parliamentary majority, only too eager to escape the worry and perils

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of a vote of censure. Perhaps we have stressed over-much the danger to people's power latent in officialism, but there is no use in blinding our eyes to the obvious difficulties of the situation.

The official is so securely hidden from the rude, public eye. He has no visible presence, but when challenged, he emits, like the cuttle-fish, an offensive discharge of ink. He is made manifest only in long yellow envelopes and in documents "not understood of the people". The hand remains hidden, but the weight is very perceptible when his agent, the tax-gatherer, comes upon his rounds. Of course, he is still responsible in theory to the Sovereign People, a fantastic theory. For should an indignant public, roused by some more than usually foolish and extravagant raid upon its hen-roosts, demand an end of this fox and call out the hounds, then the chase is hard indeed; the fox takes earth at once, and this no mere burrow in the sand, penetrable in half an hour with spade and terrier, but a spacious cavern in the rocks with passages, galleries, and maze complete, in fact, an elegant and many-roomed building. In theory the huntsman with horses, hounds, and terriers, should make short work of a single beast, a miserable, defenceless fox. But this fox takes no cross-country run, for he knows how to sit tight in his fastness. So the crafty official takes no risks with a debate in Parliament, feeble chasing though that may often be. He keeps to his many-chambered earth and sends out a wretched Under-Secretary to lead the hounds away.

Yet there is another side to this question: another plea which must be fairly put. There are in the world

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such people as obstructionists, deliberate nuisances : there are also people who with the best and most humane intentions are perfectly capable of so indulging their doubts and scruples that they will harass and hinder the rough and ready work of the nation, which must somehow or other be got through. Against perpetual interruption and perpetual criticism of a destructive order the man of action, the executive official, has a perfect right to demand protection. It cannot be too often emphasised that an excess of democratic guarantees and an over-elaborated machinery of checks may prove in the long run to benefit democratic theory at the expense of human welfare. Here, as in the case of safeguards against undemocratic action by elected legislators, some form of compromise must be found. The ship of State must be steered between the Scylla of pettifogging obstruction and the Charybdis of an autocratic bureaucracy.

It is in the sphere of foreign policy that the executive official has always enjoyed the most unfettered licence, and it is just here that his actions have the most terrible and far-reaching results. The claim of the diplomat, that he must be allowed to work at liberty because of the importance of his task, is idle ; the more important his task, the more necessary is it that he should recognise his master, the people. Only too often the diplomats and their hangers on in every nation have displayed the minimum of common sense with the maximum of pompous insolence. Any suggestion of democratic control they have always regarded as outrageous, but the human beings, whom they annex and bargain away, conscribe and

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starve and regard as mere contemptible pawns in their own immortal game, are, after all, their paymasters and employers.

Something, then, must be done. It is impossible for the individual citizen to exercise any effective check in person on the doings of the bureaucracy. But it is not impossible to make the responsibility of the executive to the legislature a definite reality. At present a desultory discussion is raised from time to time on the vote for a minister's salary. What is needed is something far more drastic. Various democracies make various experiments. Committees of the French Chamber are formed to inquire into, and to criticise the action of, the executive departments, and these committees did at one time exercise considerable influence. In Great Britain Commissions are occasionally granted to inquire into particular scandals, but that is not enough. Committees of the legislature should be in permanent session, powerful enough to displace a minister, and thus efficient to prevent such scandals arising. The value of such Committees will naturally be the value of the members who compose them, and the value of the component members will be decided by the type of man sent into Parliament by the electorate. And these committees will only be alert and effective when the members of Parliament are in a temper to insist on their maintaining a high level of industry and criticism.

That is how the responsibility falls on the ordinary citizen. He must realise that he and his fellows are the base of the governmental pyramid, and that if that pyramid weighs heavily upon them they can in the

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last resort bring the whole thing to the ground. Theirs is the Ultimate Sovereignty. No man has a right to throw stones at the bureaucracy unless he is himself always an alert, energetic, and critical citizen. The first step in democratic control must come from the democracy. "Virtue! A fig! 'Tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus!" What right have we to complain of insolent and over-bearing officials when so few will face the infinitesimal nuisance of voting at an election to decide the membership of our various local bodies. Those who are determined to sleep by the road-side cannot complain of the practical jokes of passing children. Amiable professors may create a pseudo-science of civics, as if citizenship consisted of anything more than applied morality and common sense. Our first civic duty is to discard the pleasant vice of sleeping; those who clamour for rights must be prepared to shoulder duties. Before we can set out to demand guarantees from the bureaucracy and to institute a check upon officials we must have both the energy and the ability to do our civic duty widespread throughout the commonwealth.

It would be the merest impertinence to attempt, in such short essays as these, to supply cut and dried remedies for the age-long difficulties of political life. To suggest that by merely whispering the words "Parliamentary Committee" the problem of democratic control has been solved, would be vanity indeed. Our purpose is to insist on the fact that "democracy", or people's power, has not been realised by the creation of even a truly representative assembly.

It is something to have achieved that, but, that accomplished, machinery must be devised for keeping

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that assembly representative or for ensuring the subordination of the executive official through the legislature to the Sovereign People. It is in this that democracies have most signally failed ; consequently, it is in this that democrats must make their greatest effort. The first duty of every honest political thinker is to emphasise the extraordinary difficulty of democracy. Shallow minds imagine that a mere distribution of power by the wide granting of votes and privileges will bring democracy to an easy birth. Far from it. Democracy is essentially a challenge, and it is a challenge to the individual. He must realise his own responsibilities ; he must see that the right to vote is a very different thing from the ability to vote, and that unless he is master of both, he, the boasted freeman, is simply the slave of his professional mentors and his paid officials. There is no good thing which can be won and held without effort ; if then, as is generally supposed, democracy is a good form of government, it lays, by virtue of its goodness, a tremendous responsibility on the people. We have all heard the saying that the corruption of the best is worst, and this is certainly true of democracy. In a State where the people have full rights without an adequate conception of duties, power passes rapidly into the hands of a governing caste who dole out bread and circuses to the careless mob in return for an undisputed sway. Few methods of government could exercise a more fatal effect upon the human soul. The servile State, with a veneer of democracy, is often a most pitiful way of life. Only vigilance and hard work can defeat it, and they, for the citizen already busy with his

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own affairs, are tiresome things. But they are essential.

Does the road wind uphill all the way ?

Yes, to the very end.

Will the day's journey take the whole long day ?

From morn to night, my friend.

Self-government is self-discipline.

CHAPTER NINE

DEMOCRACY AND PLUTOCRACY

WE come now to the discussion of a most intricate and, at the same time, a most critical problem. So far, we have endeavoured to trace the meaning of the word democracy, and to show the various paths of thought and of action which must be followed in order to reach our goal of people's power. We have investigated the political machinery which must be set up, and we have emphasised the necessity of popular energy and popular alertness to keep that machinery in order and to prevent the servant exercising dominion over its master. Now we have to face the criticism of those who see in political democracy nothing but a gigantic illusion. These critics examine and interpret the history of man from one point of view alone, the economic. To them, the history of man is the history of wealth, the history of power is the history of money. Consequently they urge that any attempt to realise an ideal of people's power must be primarily a matter of economics. If money is power, then a State in which money and property are unequally divided cannot be "democratic". "Political democracy" is to them as Mrs. Harris to the friends of Mrs. Gamp. One hears a great deal about it, but when one comes to look for it in reality, "there isn't any". Liberty, they say, goes with equality, and equality of rights is nothing without

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equality of property. Political democracy is nothing but a mirage, or rather it is a stage will-o'-the-wisp, contrived by the artful capitalist to lead the worker even farther into the dreary and unprofitable bog of political action. They regard political Socialism as a waste of Socialistic effort, and, therefore, as a rich man's friend. Democracy is a pretty word, plutocracy the ugly fact. This point of view is often powerfully argued, and demands careful investigation.

The first thing to realise is its lack of precision. The economic interpretation of history carries with it the corollary that all power is economic, and therefore that all efforts to create people's power must be economic too. The economic interpretation of history is often phrased in a way which renders it philosophically unsound. We may be told, for instance, that man is purely an economic creature, and that all his aspirations and activities are bound by economic fact. This view abstracts from man one side of his nature, and calls that side, man. But the spirit of man is not susceptible to these abstractions. And if such abstractions are to take place, why should not we abstract the moral, the religious, the artistic phases of human nature, and interpret history morally, religiously, or artistically? The spirit of man is, like life, a dome of many-coloured glass, and, by looking through now one pane and now another, we can stain the bright radiance of truth as we choose; it is not by many separate glances through many separate panes that we shall attain truth, but only by the use of synthesis and imagination. In other words, we can interpret any set of historical events as we please, but interpretation on the basis of a

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simplified humanity, with only one governing motive, will always be false.

Many European wars have been fought over points of religion ; but we cannot argue from this that all man's actions are bounded by religious considerations. Other wars have been waged for economic reasons ; but we cannot argue that men are only concerned with wealth. Still other wars, e.g. the Civil War against Charles I, were based on mixed political, economic, and religious emotions. The Great World War of 1914 was caused by a vast conglomeration of causes. Doubtless, economic aspirations had much to do with its origin, but the morale of the peoples, who fought it in the field and worked for it at home, was certainly kept up by the loftier considerations. All wars surely prove that men are willing to undergo the most extreme dangers and hardships for a great many different reasons. Some may have fought for one purpose, some for another, but in very few of the actual fighters were economic considerations preponderant.

Classification is essentially the task of science, and most men of science make ridiculous claims for their work. Classification is continually discovering pieces of truth and mistaking them for the whole truth. But life cannot be cut up into slices and examined at leisure under the microscope of science. Its virtue is its change and progression, and no sooner has the scientist made one classification than nature eludes him. Classification has its uses, of course, but, if it does not acknowledge its limitations, it rapidly passes from the useful servant to the tyrannous master. Accordingly, the attempt to cut up the spirit of man

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and human history, which is the work of that spirit, is bound to give a false impression. To interpret history economically will undoubtedly clear up some points of history, but that single method cannot be everywhere applied. An artistic interpretation of history would almost certainly aid the student to understand Periclean Athens, while the downfall of Rome has been "hygienically" interpreted by some who see in malaria the great destroyer of the empire. Most wars can be interpreted economically, morally, racially, or even religiously. But, though one interpretation can throw an interesting searchlight on one series of events, it cannot faithfully interpret the whole. The true historian of humanity needs something far greater than the pedestrian virtues of science, accuracy of classification and abstraction. He needs imagination with discretion, knowledge with judgment.

The economic interpretation of history therefore is neither a true method nor a false. It is a method whose virtue depends entirely on its application. But the assumption that man is a creature "economically determined", or bound in his aspirations and achievements by the eternal consideration of gain and loss, is fundamentally unsound. Let us then come to an examination of Plutocracy without the bias of a crude economic determinism. Acknowledging the free and diverse activity of man, let us investigate the statement that property is power, with its implication that true liberty can never be won on the political battlefield.

Property is powerful, of course. But is it the sole source of power? That is the crucial question. If

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it can be shown that property is the source of power, then obviously, until property is socialised, there can be no such thing as people's power, no democracy. But there is a very great gulf between the statements that property is powerful and that property is the sole source of power. True to our principle of definition, we must ensure that we clearly understand what we mean by "power". "Power" is the ability to control the action of others. If this definition holds, then property is not the only powerful thing in the world. The personality of a man who can influence thousands of others with his creed or his eloquence is powerful. The ideas or ideals which have claimed thousands of willing martyrs are powerful. They have so tremendously controlled the actions of others that they have led them to torture or the grave.

But, it may be argued, property beats them in the end. Christianity began to put up a stern fight against property, and property defeated Christianity by a discreet surrender. It adopted Christianity and gave it the chloroform of respectability, leaving it far weaker in moral challenge. It certainly made short work of Christianity as an institution, but it can never destroy Christianity, the idea. The individuals who detest the institution may always be drawing inspiration from the ideals of the New Testament—whether they profess and call themselves Christians matters not a jot—and will be influencing the movement of society. In the same way, it seems that property may kill Socialism, the institution, by adopting it, but scattered individuals will continue to be moved by the ideas of Socialism, and will continually be working their ideas into the texture of society.

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Property can usually capture and annex an institution, but it can never annihilate an idea. And it is the idea that matters. The idea comes first. The economic materialist may argue that, political democracy being mere fudge, true liberty will be established when property is equalised or socialised, possession being ten-tenths of the law. But the question that concerns us in a search for the source of power is, "What will move men to take this action?" And the answer is the idea or the ideal of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Envy and greed carry men only to short-lived triumphs and disputed divisions of loot; only an ideal can give the endurance and the cohesion that makes the wingless victory.

If property is the sole source of power, then all government is plutocratic. A socialised administration would be plutocratic: in this case, the wealth, which is power, would be commonly held, and so, the people and the property being on the same side, there would be a democratic plutocracy. But property, though powerful, is not the sole source of power. It remains, therefore, to consider the extent of the power of the property, and its relation to political democracy. Let us first put the case of one who doubts the value of political action.—"I do not bind myself," he might say, "with the rigid tenets of economic determinism. I am no doctrinaire laying the fetters of immutable law upon the soul of man, which I conceive to be freely self-determinant. But I take the world as I find it, and do not allow the fine phrases of political theory to blind me to the facts of everyday life. The whole history of British politics, to take a single instance, has demonstrated the futility

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of political liberalism. Votes, without Trades Unions, brought no benefit to the working classes. At first the possessing classes fell into a panic at the idea of extending the suffrage and prophesied, as they always do, the end of all things. But they very soon realised that the various extensions of voting-power made only the slightest difference to their own position. By their control of wealth they controlled the Press, which supplied the half-educated with their 'ideas'. By their control of wealth and education they also retained their control of the administrative machine, which is really so much more important to them than Parliament. The workers, doubtless, received a few sedatives—factory legislation, which left the factories more productive; and unemployment exchanges, which left labour more 'mobile', and therefore more profitable to handle. What terrifies the economically powerful is the threat of economic action. They know that one strike can do them more harm than a century of Parliaments. They know that labour is essential to their wealth, and that the withdrawal of labour alone can undermine their position. They have long known what the workers are only beginning to realise, that economic power precedes political power, and that the organisation of labour into an army of blackleg-proof Industrial Unions will soon turn empty rights into stern realities. Freedom, a word they used to play with happily at election times, and in the columns of their bought Press, may become a very sword or scourge when the will to be free is backed, not by ballot papers, but by the irresistible logic of folded arms. That is why power in the community to-day

is rapidly becoming limited to two rigid classes—the Syndicate monopolists of capital, and the Trade Union monopolists of labour. Parliamentary government is more of a futility than ever, and the administration of the commonwealth is carried on by secret Conferences where bargains are driven between the two great rivals. Ministers are mere go-betweens, running from one camp to the other, and pay scant heed to the House whence they derive their offices and emoluments. Now, it is the middle, the professional class who are the weakest, for the simple reason that in most cases they have only political rights to shield them. With a few exceptions their labour is unorganised, and, in the last resort, the community could exist at least temporarily without it. If there was a sudden and effective withdrawal, either at the instance of Capital or of Labour, of food, the community would perish. But solicitors, barristers, clergymen, authors, even doctors, schoolmasters, and journalists might kick their heels for a month or two without irretrievable disaster to our material needs. Votes they have, but power they have not. Only the economically indispensable may claim to be the repositories of power. That being the case, it becomes a mere futility to believe in a purely political democracy, and to build new towers of hope upon a foundation of purely political right."

What answer can be made to such a plea? The imaginary apologist for economic action took his ground as a man of the world, and on his own ground he has surely given a fair description of life as we know it. Parliamentary government has, in fact, yielded in a large measure to industrial bargaining;

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threats of industrial action are applied to gain political ends, and such threats carry weight. The middle-class is being rapidly forced into an economic position where the maintenance of even a small family is an intolerable burden. But, after all, we are not concerned only with facts, important as these facts are. We are concerned—and there is no cause to be ashamed of our concern—with possibilities as well as with the present, with “oughts” as well as with “ares”. Granted that economic power does at present dominate political power, is it necessarily vain to discuss politics at all?

If man is free, if his will is the determining factor in his own method and condition of life, then assuredly man is not the slave of economic forces. Here, as in nearly all social questions, responsibility comes back to the individual. It is because man has not shown the eternal vigilance which is the price of freedom that Parliamentary government has fallen into decay. In a state where all electors used their votes and used them with forethought, where they kept a check upon their representatives and their representatives kept a check upon their officials, there could be a reality of the people's power. But suppose land and capital remained in a few hands, would not the owners of these be able to dictate to the electors? In average conditions, yes. But given our keen electors, the answer is different. A vote is a vote and commands its members, and the members command the Government. The Government commands force, should force be needed. Thus, if a few rich men or a group of strongly organized Trade Unions obstructed the community, the community could return a Govern-

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ment to protect their own interests, and could insist on their interests being regarded. A supporter of the British Labour Party would say that this is what occurred in 1945. It was as much due to civic apathy as to their own economic power that the possessing classes held the immensely strong position in which they were entrenched. None the less, it is generally true that it is easier for the working classes to fight their way to liberty by economic action, inasmuch as the strike, though entailing many hardships, may work swiftly, while the Parliamentary coach lumbers slowly forward. At all times it is only common sense for those who are engaged in a struggle to sharpen and prepare all the weapons at their command. Nothing would be more foolish on the part of the wage-earners than to throw away the sword of Trade Unionism. But this admission does not prove that the sword is the only weapon.

Life has many facets, and man's activities are not economic alone. By all means let us have an economic democracy for the economic aspects of life; by no means let us limit both our outlook and our democracy to the economic aspect. A man has many things in common with his neighbour apart from his industry, and it is for the maintenance of these common rights and duties, arts and pleasures, traditions and affections, that the political organisation of society exists. This is the proper sphere of political action. Nor are such matters inferior in themselves to industrial concerns. But in our community they have been rendered trivial by the vastness of the industrial warfare beside them. Hence men are driven to believe that only the economic weapon counts; they have

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despair, tyranny, poverty, to justify them, but from the point of view of eternity they are wrong. "The point of view of eternity!" How heartily might such a phrase be ridiculed! Yet it is not the function of political theory to write only tracts for the times.

The coming of Communism has shown that a Party's seizure of all wealth can be just as tyrannical as private monopoly. Communist plutocracy is a real thing and it makes Democracy an empty name. An empty name, yet even those who realise it most are always asking for more. Strange that the people who are always in an unpopular minority are always the keenest democrats. Their instinct guides them aright. For they see that power lies ultimately with persons, not with institutions—with ideas, and not with property. At present Things are strong and People weak. The abolition of property by Communism is just as powerful as property itself to crush idealism and individual liberty, but that is not an eternal and immutable fact. The fault is in ourselves and in ourselves the remedy. Grant the determinist position and make economic laws the masters of men instead of mental fictions for the classification and explanation of events, and there is no more to be said. But if men are not so bound, then, all economic considerations apart, plutocracy can be destroyed whenever the people, animated by the ideal of democracy and yet tempering their ideal with energy and practical application, choose to assert their power. For that reason political theory is justified in considering the problem of democracy apart from its economic aspect. Such a statement must not be taken to deny the extraordinary importance, especially in our present

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discontents, of economic power and industrial bargaining. But it is meant as a protest against those who can see nothing in politics but futility, nothing in political democracy but a dangerous illusion. There is no one so cocksure as the denouncer of politics, but he must take his blame with the rest of us and remember that even Socialists have their own particular glass-houses.

CHAPTER TEN

DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY

IT is often assumed that democracy and liberty are the necessary complements to one another and that, where democracy is found, there will liberty be also. Those who thirst for liberty are usually most active in the democratic ranks, and often democracy is championed, not so much as a form of government conducive to human happiness, but as an efficient short cut to liberty. Yet on the face of it there seems to be no good reason why the two should be inseparable companions. Liberty is a vague term and may mean all things to all men; but some definition of it we must have. The man in the street, when asked to define liberty, would probably say, "Doing what you like"; and this, translated into terms acceptable to the dignity of a philosopher, means "the power of self-direction". A state of liberty, then, is roughly one in which people are not guided by external authority, but determine for themselves the way in which they are to live. But liberty, like other abstract ideas, becomes meaningless unless it can be translated into terms of actual experience, unless, that is to say, individual people are in practice enjoying the right of self-determination. Unless liberty means the liberty of casual people, of Tom, Dick, and Harry, it is nothing.

This point may seem altogether obvious, yet

current events prove that it is not so. There are many people, and usually they are people of weight and influence, who can imagine a Free State in which the vast majority are in reality slaves. They call the State free because it is an independent sovereign State among other independent sovereign States, but the freedom is strictly limited to the State, and is not enjoyed by the individuals who compose it. These individuals are to be governed by a superior class of the community, once the nobility and gentry and now more probably leaders of an autocratic Party, and this class is supposed to voice the real will of the people and to tell the regimented many what is their "real good". In time, the many will be sent out to fight for "their freedom", otherwise the freedom of the State, and to champion the cause of liberty! This authoritarian outlook upon life is common in every country, and its prevalence serves to prove how extraordinarily dangerous it is to talk of liberty without emphasising the liberty of the individual. It stands to the eternal credit of the British Utilitarians, now despised as "shallow", that they did realise this truth, while our Hegelian metaphysicians, who are fortunately ceasing to be fashionable, have played with their theory of the State into the hands of the bureaucrats, secret diplomatists, war-lords, and all the fraudulent "Great Men" who, at one time or another, have reduced Europe to intolerable suffering.

Accordingly, when we make use of the term liberty we must at the same time explain and emphasise our explanation that we are referring to the liberty, not of an abstraction, but of definite people. Regarding

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it in this light, we can return to our consideration of democracy. Democracy we have defined as people's power, and the realisation of this people's power demands in most cases the system of Representative Government. Representative Government implies majority rule. But does majority rule imply liberty as we understand the word ?

In so far as the majority in a democratic community can control the actions of the whole community, whereas under a tyranny or an oligarchy the majority simply allows itself to be driven by an irresponsible minority, it is certainly true that democracy is a liberal institution. After all, something of liberty has been achieved when the majority drives the minority in place of the minority driving the majority. But democracy as such, democracy without further limitations or definition, has no further necessary connection with liberty. It is quite conceivable that, from the minority point of view, majority rule might be the most odious form of tyranny, and it is well to bear in mind that a small majority is legally as powerful as a large one. A majority of one might legally pass measures inflicting the most severe disabilities on the minority and, if the minority consisted of strict legalists with a horror of lawlessness, it would have to put up with its fate, not in silence perhaps, but certainly with patient protest. It is quite conceivable that under an enlightened tyranny individual freedom and respect for minority rights might be far better safeguarded than under a rough-and-ready democracy.¹ For this reason it is not

¹ Note, for example, the position of negroes in the Southern States of "democratic" America.

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enough to follow the popular habit and to assume that democratic institutions will inevitably create personal liberty. It may be just to accept the common belief that the genuine fulfilment of democracy implies the complete realisation of liberty, and so it is imperative that, if we are to discuss democracy in full, we should commit ourselves to a more detailed inquiry into the nature of political liberty and the conditions of its successful achievement. Liberty is a term as vague as democracy, and has been equally abused. Strangely enough, in both cases, men are far more ready to die for their ideals than to define them.

The Limits of State Control is a conventional title for the problem which we are to discuss, but it must certainly be altered. We are not concerned with States alone and with national governments, but with every form of social organisation. Wherever there is common action, there the problem of liberty arises, and to say that we are discussing the Limits of Collective Control is more suited to our purpose, because of its more general application. Our task, then, is to discuss whether there are any constant principles underlying the mass of administrative fact, whether the political theorist or the philosopher can be of any use to the statesman who is called upon to administer, or to the citizen who should criticise and control administration. It might seem at first sight that in questions such as these the solution must be left to the common sense of those who have all the facts before them: it may be argued, for instance, that the rights and wrongs of total prohibition of alcohol cannot be settled in the philosopher's study, but depend entirely upon masses of statistics

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supplied by Criminal Departments and Health Authorities. That, however, is a common but complete illusion. It is the illusion of what is known as Business Government. Infuriated by the failures of statesmen whose education has been highly theoretical, people are apt to turn to so-called Men of the World, whose chief claim to power is that they have no education at all. Because one party has suffered from too much theory and too little practice, the popular temptation is to discredit theory altogether and to demand "practical men".

But the practical man, however self-confident he may be rendered at the outset by his previous successful manipulation of margarine or tramp-steamers, realises with grief in time that the government of human beings is something different from the management of markets, and that where human nature is concerned, a knowledge is demanded far deeper than mathematical calculation. Statistics are needed; energy is needed; swift decisions are needed: but all these things without some underlying principles are worth nothing. They form a rudderless ship. The practical man is singled out with joy because he can get things done; the trouble is that he rarely knows what to do. It is our business, therefore, to search for principles of right government in this matter of collective control, not because the principles can take the place of knowledge, energy, and common sense, but because without them these virtues are as useless as engines without drivers. Nor are such principles matters of great complication or of intricate philosophy; they are simply the bases of political action that suggest themselves upon reflection.

There was something supremely simple, for instance, in the theory propounded by John Stuart Mill, who classified human actions in two divisions, separating self-regarding from other-regarding conduct. In the sphere of self-regarding conduct there is no case, he argued, for collective control, but where the results of a man's behaviour affect other people, the community has a right to interfere. This test was so excessively simple that it caused not a little ridicule: Hegelians immediately replied that society was an organism and that it was impossible to consider the individual except in relation to society: there was, in fact, no such thing as purely self-regarding action, and consequently Mill's criterion was held to be quite useless.

But Mill was not really such a fool as his self-satisfied critics imagined. He would have been the first to admit that all personal conduct must react somehow and at some time upon other people, but he knew that in political matters we are only working in rough outline. The practical issue was for him that some of our actions do concern ourselves more than other people, while others have a wide social significance. For instance, it matters not one jot to me what God or when or why or how the Salvation Army worships providing the Army is confined to its barracks, but when the Army, with band complete, arrives outside my window in order to sing praises in public, its conduct passes from self-regarding to other-regarding with a vengeance. My liberty is grossly interfered with, because, so long as this corybantic worship continues, I am unable to read, write, or think, and am rendered incapable of everything except hatred.

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That is an obvious instance where J. S. Mill's criterion works admirably.

It is all a case of "more or less", and we have to judge for ourselves where to draw the line. What we have to aim at is the promotion of as much freedom as possible; that is to say, collective interference is justified where that seeming breach of liberty does in fact remove the impediments to liberty.

Compulsory education of children may seem to be an invasion of individual rights, but it can be defended on the ground that it does in the end guarantee more freedom than it destroys. For if children are pitchforked into the world without knowledge or training, they are far more at the mercy of their superiors in wealth and wisdom than if they have been educated. By destroying their childish liberty, we make some effort to enable them to be free men in later years. We should not seek to make men good by act of Parliament; but we should certainly seek to give them every chance to be good. If collective control abolishes human choice, it does a great harm; its object should be to place all in a position where they have the ability and the opportunity to make a free choice. Compulsory education does at least endeavour to put the nation in this position and can be justified on that ground.

Mill's test is not a final or a complete test. It needs expansion and criticism, but it is not merely idle; it turns us in the right direction. Reflection will swiftly add other principles which can be applied to the consideration of collective control. A statesman, for instance, should always ask of any measure whether it can actually be carried out. This criterion

may seem so patent as to be useless, yet our history is strewn with the wrecks of measures that were ruined by no other vice than their own impossibility of application.

To take an extreme example of this, a law insisting that every one should say his prayers at night would be quite ridiculous, not only because forced prayers are no prayers, but because it could never be enforced. The No Treating Order, which prevailed in Great Britain during the 1914 war, was a dead letter in most places, and, if the teetotal party had endeavoured to make it permanent, they could only have done it by obtaining complete prohibition. They could, of course, have obtained their statute, but they could not have made the statute an actually recognised law. Not only does such an order run (thank heaven!) against the grain of human nature, but its enforcement needs the presence or the threatened presence of a policeman or a spy in all licensed premises. And few policemen would care to enforce such a miserable decree. The statesman has, above all, to bear in mind that the multiplication of laws upon petty subjects is a most dangerous procedure. The more laws there are, the less easy is it for people to remember them and for officials to enforce them. A vast mass of complex and technical legislation is dangerous to a community because it encourages a general neglect and distrust of law. The continued existence of laws which nobody obeys because they are inherently ridiculous simply generates a widespread contempt for all form of authority. This was our painful experience amid the innumerable 'controls' imposed in recent years. It was the State that created the 'spiv'.

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A schoolmaster soon discovers that the simplest way to maintain discipline is to have as few rules as possible and to insist on those rules being kept. There is nothing so provocative of rebellion as an enormous series of "Don'ts" and the continued process of repression. There is a hateful type of mind, regrettably common, which glories in discipline for discipline's sake; but this type of mind, after making life miserable for thousands of innocent people, defeats its own end by setting up a violent counter-suggestion and causing people to rejoice, equally foolishly, in rebellion for rebellion's sake. In the same way the legislator will come to realise if he is prudent, that his goal should be a minimum of law and a maximum of respect for law. This respect can only be created if he sees that his measures are not inherently futile because, however worthy the object, they simply cannot be put into effect. What the statesman has particularly to create is an atmosphere favourable to law; men are perfectly willing to sacrifice liberties when they know that those sacrifices are not to be made null and void by official incompetence. The Briton is naturally law-abiding, until he finds his back broken by the legal burden.

Another question which should be asked about every measure involving collective control is whether it can achieve its object, presumably a good one, without displacing an equal or a greater amount of good. It is perfectly possible, for instance, that a law which produces one beneficial result may produce a series of detrimental consequences as well. A prohibition of alcoholic liquors in this country would obviously produce some good material results; it

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would make drunkenness more expensive and so more difficult, and it might abolish a certain amount of crime, poverty, and disease. Here, then, are certain definite forms of good to be derived from such a measure. On the other hand it is perfectly obvious that legislation of this type does reduce the citizen to the level of the schoolboy. It is a step towards the triumph of the Superior Person, whose object is to impose his idea of morality upon the masses. But morality is not a thing to be imposed or imported; its creation is essentially a home industry. The more people become accustomed to having virtue thrust upon them, the more irresponsible and childish will they become. We are under no obligation to make a final judgment on so intricate a problem; it has simply been brought up to demonstrate how one measure might promise much good of one kind and destroy much good of another. The dilemma of "England free or England sober?" is a real one and shows how necessary it is to balance conflicting values. What concerns us for the moment is the duty of the legislator to discover whether the spiritual damage done by some policy of collective control would not outweigh the positive practical advantage at which it aims.

And, in the third place, it is necessary to ask of any proposed interference whether the sphere of action is one in which spontaneity is essential. To try to regulate the freedom of thought, for instance, is the idlest form of folly. Even if it is desirable, no force on earth can drive a man to agree with you; force may drive him to say falsely that he does agree with you, but it cannot control his real process of thought.

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Free speech in the same way should certainly be left as an untouched, unhampered right, for the simple reason that if it is not free it ceases to be speech in any real sense of the word. The only result of limitation on the freedom of speech is the creation of compulsory liars, scarcely a creditable form of collective activity. While it may reasonably be argued that what a man thinks and says does affect other people strongly, this does not justify the interference of society. The proper weapon against false doctrine is true doctrine. Those Christians, for instance, who demand the imprisonment and persecution of outspoken unbelievers, might well stop to realise the foolishness of their position. If their religion cannot stand the criticisms and possibly the insults of a few park-orators, it must indeed be a flimsy erection.

In the same way a State, which in time of war persecutes anyone who disputes the justice of the national cause, displays small confidence in its own conduct. If the war is just, then the diatribes of a minority will do no harm; if it is unjust, then the critics deserve a national reward. Oppression is the tool of ignorance and fear; it is hard indeed to conceive of any harm coming to society through freedom of thought and speech. Again, history records age-long persecutions for religious reasons, every one of them futile. There can be no possible fragment of value in a faith adopted under compulsion. True religion is essentially an individual thing, an aspiration, a conviction, or a passion; to control it from without is to deaden it within. It is pre-eminently one of those things which society should refuse to touch. The same applies to all things of

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the spirit; they stand or fall by their spontaneity. We have wisely discovered means of aiding the arts without nationalising them. A powerful Ministry of Arts would be an unqualified calamity; translated into hard fact, it would mean elderly bureaucrats clothing Venus in red tape from ten to six. And such clothing is scarcely suited to the goddess.

Here, then, are some practical tests that may be applied to measures of collective control. Of course they cannot be mathematically applied, nor can they ever hope to command universal agreement. But this limitation holds of all political theory. No man can ever, in the last resort, prove that his opponent is finally and fundamentally wrong. All that argument can do is to reveal the views of both and bring them to a mutual understanding, if not to a mutual agreement. Temperament inevitably affects judgment, and there will be many and various decisions as to how the principles of collective control should be put into operation. But we must not allow ourselves to be discouraged by the fact that certainty is beyond our grasp; rather have we all the more reason for a diligent pursuit of first principles, since these principles, though they cannot promise us definite solutions of individual problems, should at least keep us thinking on sound and logical lines.

So far we have dealt solely with legal interference; but social interference is by no means limited to laws and statutes and the enforcement thereof. In many cases the tyranny of public opinion and convention is far harsher than the tyranny of law. Freedom of thought, speech, and behaviour may be guaranteed by the organised community, but gravely menaced

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by unorganised individuals. Of all forms of control this is the vilest. Its utter irresponsibility makes it both cruel and powerful, as is seen most clearly in schoolboy life, where the destruction of individuality is the general goal. Toleration is a primary virtue in any community, because without it all individuality is destroyed. And it is the cranks, the dreamers, the despised and rejected of men, who prevent society from sinking into stagnation.

Some of these may be worthless and the conduct of some may be so anti-social as to need constraint, but others are certainly the salt of the earth and the saviours of future generations. There can be no healthy community which frowns upon originality and contempt for tradition, for our social welfare depends to an enormous extent upon the presence of critical power and imaginative minds. Destroy these with ridicule and sneer and the body corporate will perish of a sluggish torpor. If we must exercise some sort of control over the actions of our fellow-citizens, let it at least be the control of law, sanctioned by the legislature, and executed by the recognised officials. Such authority may be abused, but it can never be a tenth part as dangerous as the irresponsible intolerance of unorganised individuals. This intolerance may burst into a passionate eruption of class or race hatred and result in lynch-law; or, what is almost as bad, it may smoulder on with the slow fires of cynicism, destroying the faith, the spontaneity, and the imagination of all the younger and more active members of society.

Regrettably often democracies stand in need of this warning, for their ruling vice is smug self-satisfaction.

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A tyranny may grant far more scope for social freedom than does an administration which according to good democratic practice divides political power among the people.

It is noticeable, for example, in the plays of Chekov, the Russian dramatist, who wrote of the decaying bourgeoisie of the 1890's, dreaming and dawdling in their decaying country houses, that there was a great deal of social equality in a country which had no political democracy as we understood it then and was, indeed, not far removed from the usages of serfdom. At Madame Ranevsky's *Cherry Orchard* home all classes danced and drank together at a party which she gave in her drawing-room on her return to Russia. The English squire of that period, though he might even have voted Liberal, was not inclined towards that sort of liberality. Contrast the servants in Chekhov, with their music and their free and easy ways, with the Servants' Hall in Barrie's *The Admirable Crichton*. There is no doubt that 'undemocratic' Russia had in this respect more social freedom and more equality than had the Mother of Democracies over here.

Ibsen saw the point. Strongly individualist himself and admirer of the 'lone-standing man' he realised that "the damned compact majority" was not merely an engine of political democracy and of people's power: it was also a potential engine of persecution, whose victim would be the isolated figure with an unpopular creed. Dickens also believed that political democracy could be no guarantee of personal freedom while smug bullies and pretenders like Pecksniff and Podsnap were imposing their various

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forms of moral and political humbug on all who could not afford to stand up to them.

There is not much use in dethroning tyranny if we immediately hand its sceptre to "the damned compact majority". Even if we have followed the advice of the root-and-branch secularist and republican by strangling the last king with the entrails of the last priest, there is nothing to be gained by making a new god of respectability. Democracy in itself is no guarantee of freedom in creed and conduct. It means, as we saw, nothing more than the division of sovereign power among the people; the vital point is the way in which that power, both legal and social, is used. It will only be used rightly if it is borne in mind that democracy is not an end in itself, but a means to the good life; and the good life must be lived not by a majority, but by all the members of the community. And if we are asked what we hold to be the content of the good life, we should surely reply with universal consent that its primary and most essential element is the reasonable freedom of the individual.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

DEMOCRACY AND TRADE UNIONS

THERE is a spice of ironic humour about one of the historic phrases of democracy. The cry of liberty, equality, and fraternity is composed of one concept which is too vague to mean anything unless it be far more precisely defined, and of two others which are sufficiently contradictory to cancel out. On the surface, at any rate, the principles of liberty and equality are frequently in conflict, since equality is rarely a creation of nature and is often only achieved by the exercise of stern compulsion; the kind of compulsion, that is to say, which holds the swift and the strong in check in order that the slow and the weak may not be left behind. Trade Unionism, in so far as it aims at the control and cure of natural inequalities, is to that extent anti-libertarian. This is a matter of history as well as of abstract principle, for English Trade Unionism is largely the reaction against that English economic libertarianism whose motto was *laissez-faire*, whose handiwork was England the-workshop-of-the-world, and whose legacy was great fortunes on the one hand and a suspicious, embittered working-class on the other. Trade Unionism, in short, was the inevitable and justifiable response to the pressure of free trade in the commodity called labour. The legislation which established it

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might be called the Corn Laws of the urban working-class.

Thus when people grumble to-day about what seem to be the stupid restraints upon individual energy and the pettifogging rules which bind up the muscles of industry, we must remember that if our employers' grandfathers had been wiser our wage-earners' grandfathers would not have been forced to the construction of these defences. We are, whether we like it or not, the heirs and assigns of Gradgrind, and the brakes that now appear to be wantonly slowing down the running of the industrial machine were made as checks upon his intolerable rapacity. Furthermore, we would indeed be optimists if we suggested that these Trade Union restrictions are not still of high value as fortifications against the incursions of the bad master. The word bad here carries a double meaning. There is the bad employer who is merely rapacious; there is the bad employer who is driven to be a hard driver because he is not sufficiently competent or sufficiently progressive in his industrial technique to meet his rivals without resort to sweating.

It is worth notice that English Trade Unionism was adolescent, and therefore particularly impressionable, at a time when the "wages fund" theory had a certain vogue among some economists. That theory, to use the form in which it percolated to the working man, declared that there was a certain fixed sum available at any given time for distribution among the wage-earners; accordingly, to the democratic mind, it was a logical conclusion that the equitable "share-out" of the fund could be arranged by keeping to equalitarian standards. Trade Unionist thought

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also drifted into what we may call "a labour fund" theory of a parallel kind.

The idea was that only a limited amount of work was available for the workers and that it was only just to prevent the quick and able man from seizing more of this limited and remunerative opportunity and so depriving the slow and stupid man of his livelihood. This book is not an economic treatise, and this is not the place to expose the economic fallacies of this point of view. But it must be obvious that such an argument exercises considerable compulsion over the mind that does not look beyond its own immediate interest in its own particular workshop. It is perfectly true that, if an unusually active and efficient domestic servant comes into a household previously run by two normally slow-moving and slow-witted persons, the mistress will determine that for the future one is enough; the fact that the money thus saved will be spent or invested in other directions and so give employment elsewhere is no consolation to the man or woman who has lost a job. Human nature has to be considered. We have repeatedly stressed the point that it is foolish to lose faith in democracy because its working offers a stiff challenge to the unselfishness, the industry, and the clear thinking of the ordinary man. The same is true of the industrial democracy of which Trade Unionism is the chief factor. We cannot expect the workaday plumber, whose wife and family are looking to him to find work and keep it, to be continually regarding the economic universe from the point of view of eternity. The close, personal standpoint is simply natural, and, when that is taken up, the case for

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bursting blood-vessels in furious labour, which may actually mean the discharge of the plumber's mate, seems neither logically proven nor humanely attractive.

English Trade Unionism has for these reasons preferred the standardised time-rate to the specialised piece-rate in its bargaining for wages. Thus the inherent equalitarianism of industrial democracy finds articulate expression. Foreign Marxians are often completely at a loss to understand the ways of the English Trade Unionist, because he fails to appreciate their abstract propositions about class-war strategy and also refuses to take the least interest in "scientific" Socialism. In the same way an American "go-getter", nursed in an atmosphere of commercial individualism, is appalled at English toleration of industrial restrictions. What both of our critics fail to realise is that the English Labour Movement has derived far more from simple ethical propositions than from any doctrinaire theses on the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. To read any of the books of reminiscences published by the elder statesmen of Trade Unionism is to realise how much they owed to the texts of the chapel and to the simple equalitarian battle-cries of Robert Burns and the democratic poets. Thus, restriction of output is held to be not a devilish conspiracy against the employer and the community, but the strong man's act of charity to his weaker brother. When the quick worker demands a time-wage and then limits the standard of production per hour he is turning money away from his own purse that another may not go without.

In any case, the Trade Unionist can cite numerous

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capitalist examples ; one may call to witness particularly the restrictions upon the output of raw rubber, a policy actually organised by the British Government in order to keep up the price of the commodity when over-production had driven it below an economic level. The fact of the matter is that to restrict the supply of a commodity, whether it be rubber or labour, in order to safeguard the seller from exploitation, is merely human nature. Looked at by the side of abstract and eternal economic law it may be a serious offence, but the rubber-planter and the bricklayer are not entirely to be blamed for taking the more immediate view ; and when they are called up for censure, they should share the castigation.

It may reasonably be suggested that Trade Unionism could protect the weak without shackling the strong ; that its proper business is to establish a tolerable minimum reward for the normal worker and then to super-impose, wherever possible, an attractive piece-rate to reward the extra effort of the highly efficient or remarkably industrious. A scheme of this kind exists in the composing rooms of London newspapers, but on the whole it is true that English Trade Unionism has always been deeply suspicious of piece-rates and efficiency bonuses. This is due partly to the equalitarian first principles from which it derives and partly to its economic and fallacious creed that as more work is done by one the less will remain for his neighbour.

This attitude explains furthermore the passionate excitement and the smouldering jealousies raised by craft divisions. To the middle-class mind there is something essentially ludicrous in the haggling that

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goes on as to whether some trifling piece of work belongs by right to the plumber or some other worker in the same industry. These "demarcation disputes" are a large part of the ordinary activity of some Trade Unions and they are notably common in ship-yard towns where the overhauling of ships gives ample opportunity for such argument. A lecturer, taking a University Tutorial Class in a harbour-town, once discovered that, whatever might be the subject of the discourse, were it the solar system or the poetry of Milton, the subsequent discussion would end up on the wicked conduct of the ship-wrights who were poaching on other unions' ground. This almost ferocious claim to certain industrial territory is perfectly intelligible when we relate it to the philosophic and economic foundations of English industrial democracy. The bitter fear of unemployment has dominated and embittered industrial life for many decades.

It will take a long time to convert the Trade Unionist from his belief that generous output will not bring generous wages; there is no certain guarantee that increased consumption will follow increased production and, without it, the only result will be a glutted market, and with that a fall in prices, in wages, and in volume of employment. It is all very well for nations still rapidly expanding, like the various peoples of the New World, to preach high output, but the danger of over-stocking the market is menacing them already. In the meantime the British worker clings to his equalitarian notions, which are naturally vexatious to employers and easily presented to the more secure citizen as a kind of mulish worship of

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inefficiency. The Englishman likes to consider himself an individualist, and there are many publicists who are never tired of maintaining that Socialism goes against the grain of our national tendency. Such a proposition is at best only a half-truth. Trade Unionism has been a natural and a national growth, and Trade Unionism is essentially altruistic as regards the members of the craft or trade, though an employer or a member of the general public may often have good reasons for commenting on the limitations of this altruism.

The General (or to be more accurate, the fairly General) Strike of May, 1926, was a remarkable demonstration of solidarity and unselfishness. The unfortunate citizen who found his plans and his profession and his methods of locomotion so vastly disturbed could not fairly claim that the strikers were acting selfishly. Millions of men were sacrificing their wages, endangering their positions, and enduring a storm of obloquy abroad and possibly at home with no other motive than to assist the miners against a serious loss of wages. To the average striker the cessation of work was no blow at the principles of British government ; it was simply an act of fraternity and democracy made concrete.

The strike raised large issues. It was denounced as an effort on the part of the Trade Unions to upset the Constitution. In letter it was ; in spirit it was not. It is true that some Labour extremists welcomed it for its unconstitutional ambitions while they grumbled at its executive moderation. But these men did not genuinely represent the rank and file, whose only and rather vaguely formulated purpose was to

beat back an onslaught on the miners' scanty wage. There had been sympathetic strikes before ; men had refused to handle "tainted" goods. But eminent Liberal lawyers did not remember that such proceedings involved serious breach of contract until the nuisance had ceased to be "only a little one", and became a widespread menace. But in this case there was an added complication. It could be argued that a strike without notice is a breach of contract, that breach of contract is illegal, and that illegality is unconstitutional. It could further be argued that the General Strike was more (and worse) than an industrial demonstration of working class solidarity, since it was an attempt to brow-beat Parliament and so to dethrone the legal sovereign of the land.

This latter argument was made cogent by the fact that the mining dispute was more than a conflict between a set of employers and a set of employed. The Government had long been involved as a third party, and the grant of a subsidy to the mining industry in the summer of 1925 had implicated the taxpayer (who was already used to the process) in pocket as well as in principle. The staving up of a collapsing industry could only be carried out by common aid and legislative action. Therefore a sympathetic strike on this occasion was not just the addition of economic force to the resources of one side ; it could fairly be described as an effort to make the Cabinet take action which Parliament had not authorised. The strikers' unconsciousness of this threat to the sovereignty of Parliament did not alter the nature or the conditions of the threat, and Labour Constitutionalists had to

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admit in private, if not in public, that they had placed themselves in an awkward corner. For the Communist, contemptuous alike of democratic principle and "bourgeois" legality, the answer to questioners was simple. He could defend the General Strike because a strike is a blow and the bigger the blow the worse for the employers and the bourgeoisie. To what extent a hit at the employer also wounds the employed is one of those awkward problems which Communists rarely discuss and moderate Labour is unable to solve.

There can be no doubt that a strike with a political object is incompatible with the normal forms of political democracy. If we believe in government by territorial representation, we must uphold our faith. But sectional interests can play an important part in broadening the base of democracy without upsetting it completely. Just before, during, and after the war, the propagandists of Guild Socialism expounded in considerable detail a scheme of decentralisation, which would turn the Trades Unions into operative bodies, responsible and self-governing, controlling their own industries as the agents of the commonwealth. Under this kind of Socialism the bureaucracy contemplated by the collectivist would be superseded, it was hoped, by the members of the Guild, into which the Unions would develop. "The mines for the miners" was not the objective; but the mines for the nation, democratically controlled by the miners, was the aim. Guild Socialism obviously placed enormous confidence in human nature, brushed aside the Shavian epigram that every profession is a conspiracy against the public, and looked back to the achievement of the

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medieval guilds as the proper retort to the accusations of sluggish negativity brought against modern Trade Unionism.

A few guilds were actually formed in a small way, as rivals to capitalist enterprise, but they were formed at the worst possible moment. Launched in the post-war trade boom they foundered in the slump that was to come. Meanwhile the roseate Utopianism which was the natural result of war-time promises and the grandiose schemes for "Reconstruction" withered in the cold winds of trade depression, high taxation, wage-cuts, and unemployment; social theory, which had kept its eyes so proudly on the horizon, had to deflect its gaze to hard, simple, and immediate facts. The writers who had believed that the Old Adam of sectional selfishness would vanish in the New Jerusalem of the National Guilds, abandoned their confidence. But the idea of Guild Socialism is not dead; indeed the more industries are nationalised the more disillusion do the workers suffer. The official replaces the boss; he is not a more human or sympathetic person. Often less so. Thus the worker becomes restless in the new machine and aches for a new freedom.

Various and intricate are the problems of sovereignty raised by the vision of a democratic devolution in which the Trades Unions could be responsible industrial bodies, instead of mere checks upon the employers' conduct, and the very considerable literature, in which the theory of Guild Socialism was developed in the second decade of the twentieth century, discussed in some detail these problems of democracy without effectively settling them. Those

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ideas and schemes may be taken out now for re-investigation.

History has, for the moment, passed Guild Socialism by, but the theory contains a principle so vital that it is certain to emerge again with its formulæ adapted to the new environment. The principle is simply this : that in a vast administrative unit, like a modern industrial nation, the officials' power must outrun the ability to control it. To be a single voter among many millions leaves the individual with a devastating sense of his own impotence and faith in democracy necessarily dwindles. Therefore democracy must exist in many more forms than the right to use the Parliamentary vote, and must find its strength and its reality in the life of many societies within the single corporation of the State. Devolution is made essential by the massing of population. The man who feels that to be one of twenty million voters once in four years is a barren privilege must have everybody's sympathy. But self-expression through self-government can be achieved in many other fields.

The citizen may be a member of a Trade Union, a Co-operative Society, a Church, a Friendly Society, and all manner of groups working for intellectual, social, or athletic purposes, as well as of the containing body which is the State. In any or all of these he can take a share of administration and responsibility, and it is obvious that the vitality and value of such groupings will grow or dwindle in proportion to the active participation in this government which is taken up by their members. "Leaving it all to the secretary" is as much a curse of group-life as leaving it all to the Government is the curse of national politics.

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Democracy has made Trades Unions, but it has not necessarily made them democratic. Nor has it guaranteed them a position in the national life in which they can proceed from restriction to construction. Guild Socialists were certainly right in this, that they realised the saving-power of co-operative groups as factors mitigating the deadening unity of State control. If the nation ever decides to break decisively with its present methods of conducting industry it will be driven back to reconsider the Guild Socialist theories which are now in storage on the book-shelves of the political student. It will have to shape its new democracy in such a way that the democrat's energy has many possible outlets. Inevitably a philosophy of creative Trade Unionism will be necessary to replace that of the old restrictive bodies which, under the dictatorship of circumstance, had to think so much more of equality and restraint than they did of liberty and initiative.

CHAPTER TWELVE

BACK TO CÆSAR

IRONY has become as natural to history as rain to an English winter. The greater the event, the more savage the mockery. The vast "war for democracy" did immediately upset some thrones, but it later on tumbled parliaments as well. After the autumn of 1918 had dethroned a Kaiser and some Kaiserlings, Cæsar had his revenge. The Russian Marxians declared for Cæsar; so did Italy's Fascisti. So, later on, did dictatorship overthrow representative government (or at least the forms of it) in Germany, Spain, Greece, and Portugal. The Communists and Fascists were busy in other countries crying out for salvation by the strong man or the usurping few. The reaction from "Wilsonism" was not altogether strange. There had been too much rhetoric in which the Parliamentary ballot-box was confused with a horn of political plenty. The word "democracy" had become far more common than the work which goes to make the reality. The average voter in many lands suddenly discovered what a little common sense might long ago have told him; that a right of suffrage does not fill a stomach, build a house, or create a job. The European nations had been schooled in violence by their war for democracy. War respects neither property nor person nor principle, and for the old campaigner there was little attraction in the formulæ

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of the new democracy. He began to think in terms of blows and banners ; war-psychology, once created, cannot be expected to limit itself to the war of nations. The conflict of the States was over, and the conflict of the classes began. Black shirt and red flag started to make a highly coloured chequer-board of the European scene.

History is repetitive as well as ironical. The history of Italy from 1918 onwards closely resembled the history of Italy from 70 B.C. to 44. B.C. Catiline, the archetype of Radicalism, Cicero, the Liberal Parliamentarian, and Cæsar the dictator, made up a triangle of which the "red" invaders of Italian factories, the democratic ministers like Giolitti, and the "duce" Mussolini, provided a clear enough reflection. The parallel is seen to be the more exact when one remembers that Cæsar began as a sympathiser with Catiline, while Mussolini was a leader of the Socialists. The essential split in politics is not between "the Reds" and "the Whites" (or Blacks), but between democrat and autocrat. Cæsar could make his peace with Catiline, but not with Cicero. Mussolini had more in common with Lenin than with Giolitti. The rivalry of the forum and the barrack is eternal ; two men with two clubs may hit one another, but they can also understand one another. At least they agree that mis-government by murder is preferable to mis-government by talk.

Of course there was mis-government. The crash came in the countries where Parliamentary institutions had out-grown the democratic conviction or had been forced by nineteenth-century world-tendency on nations that accepted them without alacrity and

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without the will to use them. Italian Liberalism had a tremendous emotional background, but once the impulse had waned there were no reserves of experience or efficiency to work the new machine. Democracy, when young, must share the faults and failings of youth for the simple reason that it is a great deal more difficult to choose and control a representative than to take the orders of an autocrat. Where there is no effective democratic control there must be abuse of office. The palm that is not reasonably watched begins to itch. Gibbon, with one of his superb sneers, described corruption as the infallible sign of constitutional liberty. His jest is savage, but one sees the point. Nobody will pretend that the Duma could immediately have provided efficient self-government for a nation that had not a jot of democratic experience or tradition. Nobody will claim that Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece were models of representative rule before the dictatorships struck down the parliaments. Mussolini and his imitators had their case, as Lenin, the Communist, had a case against the Social Democrats. It was the same case that had sent Cæsar across the Rubicon and made him take the crown. A dictator can usually cry out : " You have made a chaos and you call it a Constitution."

But power, lightly assumed, is never lightly relinquished. The history of Cæsarism is repetition—or rebellion—and rebellions are ugly, uncomfortable things. It is all very well to dream or versify romantically about the barricades ; any fool with a gift of verbosity can do that. But the nations that once accept dictatorship had to realise that their disease

is curable only by surgery and that surgery is painful. That is why we had to break the "dictatorship nations", while admitting that the autocratic method had probably abolished some scoundrels and cleared away some hesitant slackness or inefficiency. Dictators may die, but not until they have bred their tenacious kind. And the teaching of history is that the first dictator is the best: the stock degenerates. Cæsar did at least give order and peace of a sort to the Roman world. But, while we appraise his act, we do well to consider his heirs. There was no great gap between Cæsar's mastery of mankind and the drivelling debauchees and down-right maniacs who took up the diadem in the first century A.D. Why, one may ask, did the Roman world endure its Caligulas and Neros? Because the peace of Cæsar was also the peace of death. The Empire was numb and mortification was setting in. So did the Germans salute the loutish, ludicrous Goering.

There lies the democrat's eternal answer to the autocrat's eternal plea of efficiency. Dictatorship imposes order, and order imposed is quite a different thing from order of a natural and spontaneous growth. Tacitus accused the Roman imperialism of making a desert and calling it peace. He was right, for the Roman Empire did become a spiritual desert. Rome's legacy of ideas to the world ended with the death of Augustus. After that an engine of unparalleled power thudded slowly on, moving nothing, creating nothing. In the long run it is better that people should muddle through for themselves than be controlled with apparent efficiency from above. When the critics of democracy describe it as a slow, fumbling,

and ungainly system, let us admit their charge. But let us also ask them to prove that other systems are more wholesome in the long run. They can never do so. It is the constant fate of autocracy to turn sterile. It dries up the springs of initiative, of self-reliance, of invention. It treats men like wares, to be sorted in bundles of a dozen and sent here or there. But men are not to be so handled if they are to live fully. Democracy may fumble, but it has a kind of fertility which autocracy cannot enjoy. To read history is to see that this is not rhetoric, but reality. Whether the rival be Cæsarism or Communism (which is Cæsarism of a no less relentless kind) the answer is the same. A man must feel some power of self-direction if he is to walk with his head up. Dictatorship, following democracy, makes slouching nations. Often there may be a small band of autocratic visionaries, whooping round the dictator's throne. The young Italians who sang about the glories of youth (in the intervals of battering unarmed old men) and the young zealots of Communism who cried up the proletariat (in the intervals of murdering its representatives) were of this order. Their pride was merely the insolence of a governing class.

The anti-democratic reaction has been partly a tendency of thought and partly a practical protest against the failures of Parliaments. The first point is worth considering. Wars, dethroning reason, make the way clear for a general attack on the method of argument. European democracy grew in an age which believed in the power of mind. But since the great wars the distrust of mind has been comprehensive. We have had a new psychology which makes

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the subconscious impulse of more importance than the conscious will ; we have had a revival of superstitious and ritualistic practices in religion ; we have had a wide-spread scepticism of the mental instrument that has found countless expressions in the teaching of psycho-analysis. Autocracy has accommodated itself to metaphysical fashions, and it is not afraid to claim mystical virtues. The programme of the National Fascist Party of Italy (issued in December, 1921) broke straight out into metaphysical claims.

“ The nation is not merely the sum of the inhabitants of the country, nor is it merely an instrument of the parties within it for carrying out their purposes, but an organism embracing an indefinite series of generations in which each individual is but a transient element ; and the supreme synthesis of all the possessions of the race, material and immaterial.”

Would Communism dispute this statement which is in flat opposition to all liberal and rational thinking ?

Autocracy loves to talk like that, because such assertions of a transcendent national soul give the dictator an excuse for pretending that he is the embodiment of this mystic national individuality, and is more really representative of the people than any one elected by the vulgar method of counting heads. But such philosophic claims are extremely dangerous ; they undermine the rights of the individual and leave him defenceless against the ghostly concept of national solidarity and whatever physical presence can impose itself as the symbol of that solidarity. Hegel's absolutist metaphysics became the

basis of monarchical absolutism. In the same way this absolutism of the totalitarian doctrine gives all power to the man with a strong right arm and a well-drilled body-guard, since he can dismiss all his opponents as "transient elements", assuming for himself the function of synthesis, a process which comes in hard fact to mean "breaking heads to avoid counting them". After a taste of windy Fascist and Nazi metaphysics the proper corrective was a return to the solid and sober English Utilitarians with their insistence that the welfare of human beings is more than any high-sounding synthesis. "Each to count for one and no one for more than one." That is a rational, arguable position; the dictator's higher synthesis is merely a postulate backed by a threat—as it were, metaphysics taught by machine-guns.

To assert one's faith in democracy, accordingly, is to assert a state of mind to which the virtues of reason, argument, and conciliation appear more attractive than the medley of absolutist logic and tyrannical practice. On the whole the strong man is preferable when he claims mere strength as his asset and does not invade the pastures of philosophy with high talk of national synthesis. With reason out of vogue, dictatorship was likely to win some applause in intellectual company. But for the masses, who have either welcomed or tolerated it, the governing consideration has been its driving power. This could enforce an economic security which Parliamentary rule was failing to achieve. The supporters of dictatorship usually assumed the identity of democracy and Parliamentary institutions, and, on the whole, they do so correctly, for the kind of democracy

represented by the Guild Socialist with his theories of industrial self-government and the group-community is a very rare growth.

We have to admit that Parliamentary institutions were not working well when the attack came. But it must be remembered that democracy did not make the 1914 war which first hurled Europe into chaos; democracy was only asked to clear up the stupendous mess. Thus the Parliamentary system, comparatively young and inexperienced in many countries, was faced with an unparalleled confusion of debts and disillusion. Millions of men had been trained to slay and left to rot; currencies had been inflated to an extent which made deflation a policy of the utmost peril. Nerves and tempers were on edge and markets dwindling. Parliaments inevitably work more slowly and more carefully than tyrants, and they were now faced with a series of situations in which rapidity of decision and of execution were of supreme value. But is the Parliamentary system to be condemned absolutely because some Italian politicians fiddled while Rome burned? Is it to be for ever slighted because it failed to cope with a situation which was not of its making and for which there is nothing approaching a parallel in the entire history of the world? Mussolini and his men certainly brought to Italy an immediate respite from the guerilla warfare of all the classes. Hitler, guided by the financial skill and audacity of Schacht, did greatly relieve unemployment. But the bill for that respite had later to be paid. People who talk about the success of the dictatorship in Russia as an accomplished and finished thing may seriously deceive themselves. We cannot

chop up the stream of history into neat sections of that kind.

While we admit that dictatorship made some sort of settlement, it must also be granted that the final settlement with the dictator was a most terrible reckoning. No modern nation which has tasted self-government is going to submit for ever to government by edict and club-law. Russia, which has never had a democratic epoch, may be easier ground for the self-appointed autocrat with the machinery of terrorism as his implement of rule. But there the dictators have often despaired of the peasant and left him to go his own way. But there is no analogy between semi-Asiatic Russia and a European people which has had some experience of democratic institutions.

The dictatorship-cult of the Communist is excessively doctrinaire and democracy must save itself from that vice. It must confess its own weaknesses and temper its practice to the kind of human animal on which it has to work. Democracy widens out, but it is rash to suppose that a Parliament of All India, with a sudden grant of adult suffrage to all Indian men and women, would be an immediate success. To suppose that Eastern peoples will easily understand and successfully operate an imported outfit of Western institutions is ridiculous. If they are to govern themselves they must develop their own forms of political self-expression. Coming nearer home we must take the citizen as we find him and not expect too much where there is too little of education, experience, and restraint.

The democrat's duty is to take the long view and

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look at the years in the light of the centuries. In that case the wave of anti-democratic reaction, which raised its crest under the pressure of world-catastrophe does not seem to be the formidable billow now visualised by those who look only at the moment's happenings. When the democrat studies the outline of history, what he has to do is to relate the finest activities of mankind with the forms of government under which they appeared. He will certainly discover that freedom to speak and think is an essential condition of social vitality. This freedom may not necessarily be guaranteed by such Parliamentary machinery as we now associate with democracy in twentieth-century Europe. But it is absolutely incompatible with the suppressions and censorshipships so beloved of dictatorship. Cæsar saved the body of Rome and killed its spirit.

The strongest poison ever known
Came from Cæsar's laurel crown

So to envenom the springs of life is the enduring way of the autocrat and he must indeed be a materialist who believes that public health can be created by secret police. The New Cæsarism, like the old, may patch the social fabric in times of inclement weather. But it is not the garment which serious people consider; it is the heart-beat of the man who wears it.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA

SECTARISTS have often ridiculed religion on the ground that those who bow the knee to a divinity cannot, as a rule, give the vaguest description of their god, or of what they imagine him to resemble. That may or may not be the case, but, whether the criticism holds good or not of worshippers, it is certainly true of many democrats. The persons who cry out most loudly, and most often, in praise of democracy, are the least ready to delineate the features of the goddess. They will not adventure themselves upon her anatomy or analyse her chemical constitution. Perhaps they may regard it as flat blasphemy to treat ideals in this gross manner of materialism. Well, let them continue to cry aloud; but they will find when they are hoarse and weary, that they are the best friends of tyranny. For while they are singing pæans, the autocrat is staking out his claims; while they are mumbling their shibboleths, he is setting his chains upon the world. Idealism, which alone can save the world, can most easily destroy it. There is only a slight gulf between vision and blindness, for those who see farthest and those who can see nothing at all are often alike idealists. If the idealism of democracy is to save us it must be tempered with the hard thinking of the practical democrat, whose thought is not divorced

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from action. The tragedy of man is summed up in the famous lines :

The wise want love, and those who love want wisdom,
And all good things are thus confused to ill.

Accordingly, it is the duty of every man who thinks or speaks or writes about democracy to have some clear notion of what he means by the democratic ideal. What does the phrase imply, and how far are we justified in using it? This is plainly not a subject on which demonstrable results or a complete agreement can be reached, but we may achieve a certain clarity of thought by limiting its scope. The democratic ideal may be defined as consisting of three primary conceptions: the philosophy of will, the philosophy of fellowship, and the philosophy of responsibility. Individual taste may add other ideas to these, for every man is free to make what he chooses of democracy, but under these headings will probably fall whatever is essential to the philosophy of people's power.

(A) *The Philosophy of Will*

Democracy we saw to be the assumption of political and legal sovereignty by the ultimate general sovereign, i.e. the people. Under an autocratic or oligarchic government, the masses allow others to rule for them, partly through laziness, partly through ignorance, and partly through fear of innovation and the common acceptance of tradition. Under a democratic government, the individuals who compose the com-

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munity take over the machinery of administration, and, adopting usually a representative system, work it for themselves. It is this notion of will that is peculiar to democracy, and must therefore be considered as the absolute basis of the democratic ideal. We come at once upon two distinct and irreconcilable attitudes to government. One side maintains that the actual results are of primary importance.

For forms of government let fools contest,
Whate'er is best administered is best.

That is to say, the function of the ruler is to create by any means the happiness of the ruled. If he can guarantee peace and plenty for the subjects, then that is an ideal form of government, and that is the end of it. If the many have any sense they will realise their good fortune and remain the passive recipients of bureaucratic benevolence.

This faith is common both to dictators and to oligarchs. Sometimes a governing class or caste maintains its hold on power by creating a general confidence that this class or caste has a monopoly of political knowledge. It persuades the people that, since the task of administration is so intricate as to need special training and aptitudes, only those in the magic circle can prescribe and procure the welfare of the common herd. This conception, which is usually accompanied by an entire contempt for liberty as a political ideal, is not limited to the militarists and the "damn-you-ram-you" Tories. It is the fundamental idea of Plato's Republic and is still commonly held by English Collectivists, whose view of Socialism is the capture of the governmental

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machinery by a policy of permeation, and the imposition on the workers from above of a mass of rules and regulations which represent the Higher Wisdom of bureaucrats, up-lifters, and reformers.

The supporters of secret diplomacy maintain the same dangerous pretensions about the intricacy of their problems, and the depth of their own wisdom, but they can scarcely claim that they have produced very satisfactory results. If the justification of bureaucracy is efficient public service, then secret diplomacy must certainly be found guilty. At other times the claim of supreme wisdom is made not for a class, but for an individual. This cult of Cæsarism has been common throughout the ages and often popular. Julius Cæsar justified his unconstitutional actions on the ground that constitutional government was carrying Rome to ruin, and that he could by a dictatorship restore order and create a general level of security and contentment for the community. This he did actually achieve, and, if we are to use the sole criterion of material results, the early Roman Empire was probably a happier place than the late Roman Republic.

Cæsarism is also quite possible in a country where there are the forms of democratic government. The General Election of 1918 was fought largely on the personal issue of Mr. Lloyd George's character and capacity; he demanded to be sent back to office with a pledged and servile majority to carry out any line of policy that might come into his head. He demanded, that is to say, a dictatorship to deal with an exceptional situation, and his request was granted. The people of Great Britain, being at once tired out

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with the war, elated with victory, and confused by the enormous problems to be faced, gladly ceded their powers of self-direction to a man who certainly never shrank from responsibility. Here is a plain case of the abnegation of the will to self-government, and the temporary toleration of Cæsarist methods. The democrat on the other hand argues that what really matters is the element of will and that it is far better for people to do things for themselves than to have them done for them. The Cæsarist lays all his emphasis on his results ; he divorces the happiness created by an action from the action itself.

But to the democrat this is impossible. He maintains that the value of the happiness depends upon the way in which it has been won and is largely conditioned by the participation in the act of winning it. In other words, he claims that it is better for the community to assume responsibility, to make its own efforts towards self-government, and to struggle on through blunders to its goal, than to sit down quietly and to hire experts to come and undertake its administration as they might contract for a business order. Quite apart from the fact that experts are often frauds, and make a far greater mess of their work than would an ordinary bus-driver if called to cabinet rank, it is thus seen that the British process of "muddling through" is well in the democratic tradition. It would be ridiculous to say that democratic government is necessarily muddled, but it is quite fair to say that, even if it is muddled, this does not by any means settle the question.

It all comes back to a point of ultimate values. Which is preferable : to govern yourself and to do it

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only moderately well, or to sit down passively and to have it done for you? The answer, surely, will depend on the nature of the operation in question. If it is something purely material, like having your hair cut, or your teeth drawn, then there can be no possible reason for refusing expert assistance, unless the charges are too heavy for the nature of the service rendered. No spiritual benefit can be gained from wasting time with the scissors and cutting your hair off in patches, or from attaching a piece of cotton to your tooth and pulling hard. But government is not a purely material question. Where it is purely material, as in the provision of drains, it is certainly best to place an expert in charge. But in the direction of policy, in the choice of ends, not of means, in choosing the kind of life and the kind of happiness that the community should strive for, government becomes a spiritual affair. And here it is indubitably better that the individual should act for himself than that he should be continually led from above.

This is not a preference that can be proved to be either right or wrong; it is a question of taste. But in the dispute the true democrats will all be on one side. To them the development of personality by choice and the assertion of will is essential. It is just this which makes the really free man and distinguishes him from what Shakespeare calls the "base mechanicals". Democracy is a philosophy not only for corporate bodies, but for the individual. If he prefers to sleep away his life with the pleasant faith that his hireling politicians will play policeman on his behalf, he is at liberty to do so. If, on the other hand, he prefers to shape issues for himself, to show himself

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a free and responsible person in choice and action, to control as far as he can the conditions of his labour and the amenities of his local life, then he may toil and sweat in vain, he may encounter disappointment and disaster, but, should he obtain success, his exhilaration will far exceed in quality the placid happiness of the drowsy underlings of Cæsar. And, even in the ups and downs of his career, even when things look blackest, he will have at any rate the reward of fine emotions and deep convictions, the sense, for instance, that he is doing something worth while in accepting the challenge of life. Such action will counter-balance those material blessings which the subservient cult of efficiency might have made his own. This may serve as a rough and inadequate outline of the feelings of the democrat who has considered the fundamental implications of his creed.

(B) *The Philosophy of Fellowship*

Few words are more open to abuse than "fellowship". It is the key-note of much hazy benevolence and vague goodwill. If it is not to become a meaningless compilation of letters, we must be careful to give it a most precise content. It must become the ingredient of a clear-cut philosophy as well as the atmosphere of a faith. "All good things come from the heart," but as Lord Morley pertinently added, "they must go round by the head." Certainly the furious fellowship of the sentimental orator is better for mankind than the furious misanthropy of the realist Jingo. But, while the latter results usually

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in the desired bloodshed, the former often remains only in a sonorous state of signifying nothing.

Democratic thought implies equality, because the only practical method of dividing power and sovereignty among the people is on a basis of equality. By acknowledging the principle of equality, we acknowledge also the principle of Right, not necessarily a system of conflicting and arbitrary Natural Rights, but a universal right to have rights. But if we accept the rights of man, we must also accept the rights of men. By espousing the cause of democracy, we commit ourselves to fellowship, in as far as we allow that one man is just as good or as bad as another. Democracy in the true sense dies with the admission of class and race superiority. Obviously all men are not alike, and white is different from black, but that is no ground for a rigid stratification. The United States of America, founded ostensibly on democratic principles, tolerated chattel slavery for a considerable period, and to this day the Southern States have allowed one law for the white man and another for the black. In parts of the British Commonwealth there is no true commonalty of rights among men of different colour. Plainly in this case democracy has not carried fellowship in its pocket; and we may be right in our view that this does not prove fellowship to be stupid, but some whites to be queer democrats.

The first implication then of fellowship is the abnegation of individualism, whether commercial or national. It is an odd confusion that has connected nationalism with democracy, for nationalism so easily becomes aggressive and rapacious. Nationalism may,

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true that co-operative action produces certain peculiar effects. The emotion of a crowd is greater than the emotion of all the crowd-makers taken individually and summed up, because the individuals react upon one another. Thus the good-will of a co-operative commonwealth might be greater than the massed good-will of many isolated people; the very fact of co-operation, the existence of a common purpose, elicits loyalties and ardours and activities that the cold atmosphere of individualism would have destroyed.

Association for a social end may not create a "new person", but it certainly does create a tradition or a complex of ideas which is of extreme value. It passes from one man to another, both giving inspiration to them and drawing inspiration from them. A College or University, for instance, is a historic voluntary association of people with a definite purpose; whether it forms "a real person" is disputed, but undeniably it has a common tradition and outlook, in which all new-comers may participate, to which they may add, or from which they may detract. The "idea of the place" is caught up and passed on; and so with other fundamental institutions. Co-operative purpose, in other words fellowship in work and life, is of immense value as a stimulant of loyalty and as a challenge to abilities. It appeals to the creative side of our nature, not the acquisitive and destructive. A community which was rich in these co-operative purposes, these floating traditions of fellowship and these legacies of achievement, would certainly be far happier than one bound by an excessive creed of competition. And it would also be far more democratic.

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(C) *The Philosophy of Responsibility*

Thoughtless people often regard democracy as a great distributive benefactress, pouring unstinted happiness from her miraculous horn of plenty. They are the counterpart of those dreary martinets who are for ever talking about discipline. The former think only in terms of rights, the latter only in terms of duties; whereas sanity demands that we should think in terms of both. Rights and duties are co-relative and if democracy brings equality of opportunity, it also brings equality of responsibility. The gift of freedom is like the gift of a bicycle; it is a doubtful blessing until we have learned to ride it correctly. The right to vote, without the ability to vote, is simply no guarantee of freedom whatever. The owner of that vote will not possess the full power of choice and of criticism; his mind will wander at the mercy of the falsehoods and catchwords set to ensnare him by the politicians. That perhaps is why the possessing classes, once so shy of extending the suffrage, were later so ready to see it distributed broadcast. They knew that the mere tenure of a vote means nothing at all, or at most very little. What really matters is the mind of the voter. If the mass of the people remains receptive of any trash and utterly incapable of getting behind words to the things they should represent, people's power can never be realised. Power will remain in the hands of those who control the formation of public opinion. There is only one force that can guarantee true democracy and that is education.

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By education we do not mean the study of textbooks or a diligent application to mathematics. We mean the training of critical powers, the creation, if you will, of a healthy scepticism. So long as the many are worshippers of words, and do not realise that they are bowing the knee to empty symbols, so long will the word-wizards hold the throne. But when the majority begins to ask for the realities that lie beneath the symbols, for the facts that are hidden in the phrases, for the translation into human experience and human happiness of the magniloquent headlines of the papers, hope dawns for democracy. At present people are crushed beneath institutions and things are buried beneath words; the world cries out for a double act of liberation.

Good-will, essential though it be to our salvation, cannot save us by its own unaided effort. Not until there is a universal level of critical intelligence and an ability to get at general principles below the multitudes of facts, will there be a real liberty in which the mind of man can find free choice. Education is a vague word, but the side of education which is most important to-day is that wherein tutor and student meet as equals and are prepared by lecture, question, and discussion to forge out their attitude on all social and economic problems. The vital point is that there should be the spoken word in public and the written word in private; the student can adopt the Socratic method and hammer away at his tutor until all terms are defined and mutually agreed upon; then, later on, he should put on paper his own views and discover for himself in the travail of private composition whether his own ideas are so clear

and strong in his mind that they demand spontaneous expression.

Nothing could be more disastrous than the educational plan which simply flings a text-book at the child or adult and tells him to "learn" it. This inevitably perpetuates the tyranny of words. Most text-books of English history used to be either compendia of trivialities or else extremely partial accounts of national glory. To "learn" them was to risk a plethora of ill-digested puerilities or of actual falsehoods. But, it may be argued, at this rate a man won't learn anything; if he only learns his own ignorance, if he knows what he does not know, if he realises the vast complexity of issues and forbears to heal the agony of nations with a catch-word, he is well on the road to true knowledge. He has at least emancipated himself from the idols of the phrase-market, and can set to work to discover the true gods for himself. What is most needed in this country to-day is a new Socratic method with a band of young Socratics, who should contribute a large share of the adult education of the nation. Only by a resolute effort to make words definite and issues clear can the muddy national thought of our day be filtered and made clean. In the meanwhile every teacher and every student, young or old, who makes of education a searchlight on reality, is the genuine servant of democracy. For such men and women are building a society in which freedom has a bulwark, where the right to choose is fortified by the capacity to choose, and liberty of thought is made manifest in free and powerful thinking. Democracy imposes upon us not only the duty of thinking for ourselves, but also of

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seeing that the whole community is in a position to think for itself. An uneducated democracy is a contradiction in terms, for the simple reason that power will remain with those who can manufacture opinion at their will.

In the second place, democracy brings with it the responsibility for drudgery, for hard, unremitting work. If people determine to do their share of government for themselves instead of handing it over to Cæsar, they must be conscious of the severity of their task. "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance", and eternal vigilance is a big demand to make. If democracy is to be a thorough and a successful method of administration in every sphere of life, every individual must be prepared to play his part. Each man must be ready to investigate the various problems before him and to choose with real care his representatives for political, industrial, and social bodies. Above all, he must at least take the trouble to vote. At nearly all modern elections, both for political and industrial purposes, nearly half the electorate will not undergo the trivial fatigue and nuisance of making a decision. Such indolence is absolutely destructive of democracy. It makes smooth the way for the wire-puller, the caucus, and the party boss. It reveals an apathy which encourages the self-seeker to impose himself upon an electorate that takes no thought for the morrow. It makes government by consent of the governed a pure matter of form.

At the present time, in all centres of population in this country, the democratic machinery is kept moving by small groups of energetic people. It will be found that the same man is on the Town Council, on the

Trades Council, on the Education Committee, and even secretary of his own Trade Union branch. The keen Conservative will likewise be over-employed in public service of all kinds. There is far more work to do than can possibly be done by this handful of people, who are sacrificing their hard-earned share of leisure and often their health in toiling for the apathetic and ungrateful majority. They deserve the highest praise for their efforts, since they do realise that democracy is a matter of spade-work, but, until the others come up to take their turn, democracy must suffer and suffer heavily.

It is admitted that most men come home tired from their work, and that the work of women in the home is never done. It may be impossible for all men and women to keep themselves adequately informed on the questions of the day, or even on the questions that touch their own interests most closely, but the fact that in every centre some individuals have already done so much for democracy shows that much more could be achieved if all took up only a tiny share of the enormous civic burden. The gross unfairness of the present distribution of effort is an obvious iniquity. The basis of the general apathy is not, however, a selfish desire to shove the work on to the other man, but a real ignorance about the amount and the importance of the work to be done. Democracy has been so long preached as a gospel of rights that few people bother their heads about duties. They have accepted the fatal tradition that government means getting things done for you ; that is quite right, if you also accept Cæsarism.

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then look round for some self-sacrificing individual to do all the work. If he is not forthcoming, the self-interested individual certainly will not fail to put in an appearance. And then at once democracy breaks down; for democracy demands not only a high level of general intelligence but also a high level of honesty and energy. The corruption of the best is worst, and no form of government is so debased as an apathetic, corrupt, and ignorant democracy. The nation which determines to achieve a full and genuine democracy accepts a tremendous challenge; there will be no limit to its labour and no respite from its responsibilities. But the more formidable the task, the more is it worth doing.

Such words may savour of the sermon and be set down as the platitudes of the preacher. Yet, stale as they are, the time demands them. Democracy is on the lips of all and in the minds of few. It is, let us face the fact, a dangerous word. It means too much. To Edward Carpenter, in his *Towards Democracy*, it was the vaguest, if noblest, of ideals, a compound of human fraternity and a dislike of railway engines. To one man it means Parliamentary Government, to another Industrial Unionism. We have been faced with the entertaining spectacle of a world in which every one is trying to show that he is more democratic than everybody else. Democracy is a term with an infinite capacity for arousing enthusiasm and effort. If we are to use it we must be all the more prepared to give it a definite content. And, doing so, we must not shirk the fact that democracy means drudgery and disappointment in the black days as well as ecstasy in the fair ones;

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that if what we seek is security, we had better remain content with some sort of Cæsarism; and that the appropriate pleasure of democracy is that of a strenuous uphill journey with the prospect of a fine view ahead.

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AND now Socialism has come to Great Britain and the modest experiments in Collectivism made since 1945 may soon be greatly enlarged; indeed they surely must be enlarged at some time, since it is scarcely conceivable that the Labour Party will never again have a clear majority. As I write the Coal Industry, Lighting by Gas and Electricity, Cables and Wireless, the Bank of England, the Railways, and much Road Transport have been taken out of private ownership, with compensation, often deemed inadequate, to the previous possessors. They are administered by National Boards on behalf of the nation; the extent to which those Boards are responsible to Parliament and the liability of the appropriate Ministers to answer questions about their working remain somewhat vague. The Iron and Steel Industries are being transferred to public ownership and bureaucratic control. As I write, the Lords are fighting the Commons on this and demanding no further nationalisation until a General Election has taken place. A National Health Service has also been set up.

Here, it may be said, we have Social Democracy at work. But to bring in the word democracy is certainly rather queer. For there was no clear majority among all the voters in 1945 demanding these measures; the Socialist Parliamentary majority was largely a product of that 'luck of the polls' by

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which the Conservatives had benefited in the past. Without some sort of Second Ballot or Proportional Representation, a General Election will always be a game of chance, since it is quite easy for a minority of the voters to capture a majority of the seats.

Nor can it be urged that there is anything particularly democratic about Collectivism and the working of a nationalised industry. (Collectivism is the term which describes the acquisition of industries by Parliament in a constitutional way and their conduct for the State by the Civil Service or by appointed Boards and staffs which have the methods of Civil Servants.) I have just been travelling from the North of England to the South in what is now a piece of my own property, that is a British railway train. But there is no visible difference except in some initialling on the rolling-stock; the staffs are the same and happen, at the moment, to be even more discontented with their wages and conditions than they were under 'Capitalism'. They have no democratic rights, no workers' control. If the phrase wage-slave was justly applied to them when shareholders owned the railways (and often failed to get any dividend at all) it is equally applicable to-day when the railways are supposed to grind out their three per cent. to the holders of State Bonds—and, as a matter of present fact, cannot possibly do so without a subsidy.

Our experiments in Collectivism may have saved us from some industrial strife: probably in the coal-mines they have. But everywhere the worker, who has got rid of his 'boss' only to find himself under the direction of an official, is scratching his head and wondering where the benefit is to be found.

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Frequently he appears to conclude that new bureaucrat is but old boss writ large.

That this would happen was correctly prophesied by the Guild Socialists over thirty years ago. They then attacked Collectivist Socialism on the ground that it only offered a change of masters and methods and was not in the least democratic. They said that a worker would find no more freedom under a State Department or a National Board appointed by the politicians than he had previously done under a capitalist Board of Directors with its managerial set-up functioning according to command. That this has been proved true is made manifest in the newspapers every day. It has at last been realised, as the Guild Socialists had insisted that it would, that under State Socialism or Collectivism the Trade Union Leader becomes absorbed in the new machinery for conducting the industry; he may leave the Union altogether and join an Administrative Board. Even if he remains in the Union he comes, if he has any Governmental functions, to be regarded as 'Boss Class'.

Hence his admonitions, however fully justified, that strikes in a nationalised industry are crimes against the community and the very negation of Socialism, are neglected or even jeered at. The workers on the job feel that he is 'a bit of Westminster' and no longer 'one of us'. Hence discontent intensifies and anarchic action follows. I fail to see how even the most enthusiastic Collectivist could deny that here is a fair picture of the democrat's dilemma in 1949.

He had, if he were a Socialist, to applaud Nationalisation and to deplore action taken to sabotage it (and of course the whole national economy too) by

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sporadic and unofficial strikes. But sporadic strikes in certain mining areas have been frequent and even common in the London Docks, where the Dock Labour Board appears to be no more popular than was the late Lord Devonport when Ben Tillett prayed for fire and destruction to fall on his lordship's head—and fortunately got no answer to his prayer.

G. K. Chesterton once observed that the Nationalisation of the Land would only mean the loss of title-deeds by the Duke of Sussex and his re-emergence as State Commissioner for Sussex Lands with compensation and a salary suitable to his station. We have not yet proceeded to 'collectivize' the land, though the Town and Country Planning Act does drastically put an end to the liberties of the landlord. But, where we have collectivised, we have translated the tamer Trade Union bosses to the Boss Class and its rewards, thus bringing the Tammany slogan of 'The jobs for the boys' from New York and Washington to our own Westminster. The man at the base of the great Trade Union edifice finds all this uninteresting and unrewarding to himself.

So he lends a ready ear and a simple mind to the Communist who tells him, with some justice, that this kind of Socialism has nothing to do with what he calls 'workers' democracy', that it is only Capitalism wearing a faintly red tie, and that it is no good at all to John Smith of the London Docks. The latter has already got security of employment at a good wage; so he is not at all inclined to listen when a Labour Minister or a promoted Trade Union leader starts to lecture him about his consequent duties in a democratic community. If the Trade Union leaders,

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now so glib about the necessity of accepting democratic duties in return for democratic rights, would say more about these duties at election-times and not keep them until they are safely back in office, one could respect them far more readily.

Thus the problem of creating a democratic Socialism inside the limits of Collectivism is the urgent issue of the moment, especially for Socialists. Guild Socialism a half-way house between Syndicalism and State Socialism, is probably impractical and stands no apparent chance to-day, but the decentralisation of industrial and economic control so that, through his right to vote, the worker feels that he is Somebody in the factory as well as in the State is the obvious necessity of our time. Yet the difficulties here are enormous; for democracy in industry will have to be executed with restraint and good judgment if it is not to produce confusion and contention. If, for example, the hours and conditions in a factory fall within the say of a workers' committee, it is obvious that the said committee must be extremely well informed about the economic state of the country in general and of their own industry in particular: nor will information alone suffice; there must be the courage to take and to enforce unpleasant decisions.

It was never the purpose of this book to recommend solutions; its function has been to define terms and to analyse ideas. Even were I capable of doing so, I should not proceed further with industrial policies. They are varied, they are complicated, and they have their own considerable literature. My purpose has been to show that the supposedly twin conceptions of State Socialism and self-government can turn out

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to be strangers in the modern Social Democracy or, as it is now sometimes called, the Welfare State. The Welfare State is one in which there is a basic equality. Necessities of mind and body are guaranteed to all at the common cost while opportunities for individual initiative are limited and the building up of personal fortunes, even though it be by genuine enterprise and hard work, are prohibited by crushing taxation. The welfare of the Welfare State is thus a restricted article, but it is none the less of very great value and much esteemed by those who have been sufferers in the past from a more competitive system in which personal thrift was difficult or impossible and there was little defence against unemployment. Even the middle class, with its individualist tradition, begins to be grateful, in hard times, for free places for their children in well-equipped schools, which once demanded considerable fees, and for relief from many cares about health and from heavy doctors' and dentists' bills.

Devolution of power, accordingly, is the obvious remedy for the pains of democracy. If the individual in a huge community feels himself to be a powerless midget—the greatest modern democracy, that of the U.S.A., surges to a population total of 150,000,000—then surely he will be concerned, as a self-governing citizen, if he is only one of a few thousand. If towns and parishes, factories and workshops have democratic systems, may not the individual find in these that sense of being somebody and meaning something which he misses as a unit among many millions of units? In logic it seems that he must. But, as we have seen, it does not usually work out that way.

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The figures of national voting are far larger and more encouraging than those of local voting. Furthermore, the difficulties of applying democracy to the regimen of the workshop and the control of industry are very great. The Guild Socialist theories, rightly aimed at countering the dullness of the bureaucratic Collectivism now being imposed on Great Britain, were worked out years ago by men with no experience of industrial management. Thus they need drastic revision in the light of present experience.

There may be some effective use of democratic devolution inside the big nation-states. In recent years there has been a growing unrest in Scotland and Wales, an unrest which permeates all political parties. There is a feeling that 'London Rule' is intensified by nationalization of industries and that the Scottish and Welsh people stand less and less chance of consideration as the huge new industrial unit of a Socialist Great Britain is built up. The demand for Home Rule in these countries is weakened by the follies of the extremists ; there could, of course, be nothing like separation. But moderate opinion is increasingly convinced that a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh, with powers perhaps slightly greater than those of the Northern Irish Parliament in Belfast, should and will come before long. Wales, which at present has not even the recognition granted to Scotland of its own Secretary of State, is also much distressed by neglect of Welsh matters at Westminster.

But, naturally, in both countries there are many who profit by 'London Rule' and are eager to maintain the present state of affairs. On the whole those Scots and Welshmen who are interested in

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democratic principle and practice are eager to see something done that will effectively restore the nationhood of their countries and make self-government a reality instead of a phrase. Here again there are many technical administrative difficulties to be met in creating the new democratic order of a federal Great Britain, but such difficulties cannot be final or fatal and my own surmise is that, before many years have passed, we shall have made this advance towards devolution, since it will be increasingly plain that there can be no true democracy without continual readjustment of the governing units and the governmental régime.

There is one other approach to a fuller democracy and that is by way of property. It is arguable that freedom essentially depends upon ownership. It may be private ownership; the slave is he who has no ownership at all and can only be owned. The member of a Socialist community is, in theory, an owner. The British citizen to-day is, to the extent of one-forty or fifty-millionth share, an owner of mines, railways, and so on. But this share is trifling and his control over the property is non-existent. So the public ownership provided by Socialism is not a thing directly felt in private life. The citizen may triumphantly announce 'This is my railway train', but he will find himself under arrest if he treats it as such.

All the trends of our time are against possession and development of private property, as opposed to holding infinitesimal shares in public property. The chief desire of the Socialists is, for tactical reasons, always to prevent people owning their own houses and land and to make things as difficult as possible

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for small businesses : the smallholder tends to become Conservative and the Conservatives, as one of the Socialist Ministers recently and explicitly defined them, are ' Vermin '. So when Britain's big new housing programme was launched after the war, nearly all the houses were to be built for hire by public authorities, not for sale, lest the supposed vice of ownership should arise. There is really no good reason why a Socialist should not own his own house and take pride in improving it for his own benefit : indeed, it would certainly make for better citizenship if people could develop their own property and put their personality into their possessions. A democracy of small-holders has some chance of being a genuine democracy, with a sense of responsibility widely spread. But the prospect is feared, for party reasons, by all who put their Socialism first and their democracy second.

For a similar reason schemes of profit-sharing, which would identify the worker with the fortunes of his employer and the firm, are disliked by Socialists ; they might breed Conservatives. Here again, they think, might be the conditions for creating independence and stimulating individualism. So the conditions, however logical, must not be allowed to arise. It is true that modern methods of production, in many forms of industry, favour—or seem to favour—the large unit, so that those who dislike the smallholder can plead that efficiency lies with the big factory or ranch. The Conservatives have certainly been somewhat slow and tepid in welcoming profit-sharing schemes. But for the creation of a healthy community, in which men take a pride in their own

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work and can watch its expansion and improvement, ownership either of land or of shares in the business is extremely valuable.

It is one of the major disasters of our time that both Socialism and Big Business have so often shared this distrust of the small unit and the independent craftsman or crofter. When men own property they may still be poor, bitterly poor, but they have some independence and are more truly citizens than those who live in a hired house and then hire themselves to the State or to employers in whose interests they have themselves no interest whatever, so long as enough business is done to save them from the sack.

British Democracy has thus several possibilities of development ahead of it; it can be expanded into small units, it can be applied to the factory and workshop, it can be linked with the national feeling of the Welsh and Scots, and it can be carried into the ownership of land and of industrial concerns. But in no case will the advance be easy: once more the road is uphill, 'yes, to the very end!'

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